GRAMMAR. 
called forth its energies, many have operated 
universally. Whatever have been the variety 
of terms, and of the modification and arrange- 
ment of them, the grand objects of men, 
in the formation and extension of language, 
have been the same, — to communicate their 
sensations, their judgments, their reason- 
ings; to express the objects of their 
thoughts, and the changes and connexions 
observed among them, — and, to do this with 
dispatch. This has produced great uni- 
formity in the general principles of lan- 
guage. But the connexion between w'ords 
and thoughts Ls arbitrary, as well as the 
mode of connecting words themselves. 
Hence, with much uniformity, we meet 
with much variety : and hence, universal or 
even general grammar, must be confined 
within very narrow limits, till the phenome- 
na of a variety of languages have been ex- 
amined, and their correspondence with each 
other, as well as their diversities, ascertain- 
ed. For some of those more general prin- 
ciples which may be regarded as the foun- 
dation of language in general, we refer our 
readers to the articles Language, and the 
Origin of Alphabetical Writing : we shall 
here content ourselves with making the phi- 
losophy of our own language our principal 
object, though we may occasionally be led 
to state the more general principles of gram- 
mar, and derive our illustrations from other 
languages. Such a mode of procedure may 
contribute to render the practical use of 
our own language more clear and certain. 
Of the Arrangement of Words. 
5. The first object of scientific grammar, 
?s to form an arrangement of the sorts of 
words composing a language. In languages 
which admit of various changes in the form 
of words to denote changes of meaning, the 
arrangement, in a great degree, is pointed 
out for the grammarian; and a technical 
classification will, in such cases, have a de- 
cided superiority over one founded purely 
upon scientific principles. In languages 
like our own, we are less shackled by the 
contrivances of art ; yet our arrangements 
ought to have in view the advantage of 
practice. 
6. The true principle of classification 
seems to be, not essential differences in the 
origin or signification of words, but the 
mode in which they are employed. It 
should, however, be steadily kept in view, 
that all distinctions among the sorts of 
■yrords have gradually arisen out of the cir- 
cumstances in which language has been 
formed, and proceeded towards maturity ; 
and that such distinctions are by no means 
to be extended beyond the present employ- 
ment of words. It is necessary, for conve- 
nience and dispatch, that we arrange ; but 
arrangement, must not supersede further ex- 
amination. The fact is, that originally there 
could have been but one sort of words, the 
names of the objects of our sensations and 
ideas. From these all others must have 
sprung ; but, without words expressing af- 
firmation, language must have moved very 
slowly, and often have been very ambi- 
guous ; and therefore we may reasonably 
suppose, that the ever active principle 
of association would soon transform nouns 
into verbs, by making them in certain situa- 
tions expressive of affirmation. From these 
two classes all the rest have sprung ; and 
though it is desirable, and even necessary, 
for the grammarian to arrange, it should 
ever be carefully borne in mind, that his ar- 
rangements respect the present contri- 
vances of language; and that he, who would 
look into the causes of these contrivances, 
must retrace the steps which have been 
trodden, and see what were the procedures 
of those periods when language was merely 
the child of necessity, not the organ of long- 
established and intricate associations. The 
philosophy of language is one branch of the 
philosophy of mind, and neither will he 
fully understood till both are. 
7. The objects of sense and intellect are, 
in reality, nothing more than properties, or 
collections of properties. The mind, how- 
ever, resorts to a support for those proper- 
ties ; something by which they are connect- 
ed ; in which they exist : and’ this we call 
substance. As far, however, as this word 
has any meaning, it signifies nothing more 
than a collection of properties existing, or ca- 
pable of existing, independently of other pro- 
perties. These properties may be consider- 
ed collectively ; or they may be thought and 
spoken of, though they cannot exist, sepa- 
rately. We can think of no material sub- 
stance which does not possess, at least, two 
properties ; no visible object, for instance, 
can be without colour and extension : but 
we can think of extension and of colour se- 
parately, that is, we can direct the atten- 
tion of the mind to each of them exclu- 
sively, of the other properties with which 
it may be connected. This separate or ex- 
clusive attention of the mind is called ab- 
straction. It is a very simple, though a very 
difficult operation of the mind. It is often 
confounded with generalization; but though 
