GRAMMAR. 
tion of them must, however, have been im- 
mediate. The difficulty of producing a 
great number of distinguishable articulate 
sounds, and the operation of the associative 
power, first led to generalization ; conve- 
nience, perhaps we may justly say neces- 
sity, led to its extension and completion. 
When a number of things resemble each 
other in some striking particulars, we class 
them together in one spe.eies, and give to 
the species a name which is applicable to 
every individual included in it. When se- 
veral species agree in some common pro- 
perties, we refer them to a higher class, 
which we call a genus, and to the genus 
give a name which is applicable to every 
species and every individual included in it ; 
and this classification we extend to the li- 
mits of human knowledge ; and it is one of 
those admirable contrivances which are the 
result of necessity or of casual circum- 
stances, but which, being extended and per- 
fected by science, contribute essentially to 
the progress and diffusion of knowledge. 
But though it is necessary, for the purposes 
of communication, that many names should 
be applicable to classes of individuals, it is 
also necessary that there should be others 
capable of denoting individuals, without the 
circuitous plan of naming the general term, 
and the distinguishing qualities of the indi- 
vidual : and, accordingly, we find in all lan- 
guages numerous words, which apply to an 
individual only, or, at least, are at once re- 
ferred both by speaker and hearer, to an 
individual. Those names which, when 
alone, apply to a number of individuals, 
are called general terms, appellatives, or com- 
mon nouns ; and those which, when alone 
are used to denote particular individuals* 
are called proper nouns. Sometimes proper 
nouns are so applied, as to become com- 
mon nouns, as when we say, the Caesars, or 
the Ptolemies. These are instances of the 
commencement of generalization ; but there 
is another mode of the use of proper nouns, 
which is more illustrative of the processes 
actually adopted, in employing terms origi- 
nally denoting an individual, to denote 
classes of individuals, who resemble him in 
some striking characteristics : thus, we say, 
“ the Bacons, the Newtons, and the Lockes’ 
of modern times,” meaning, by these terms’ 
all those individuals who have resembjed 
Bacon, Newton, or Locke, respectively, 
in the mode and success of their investiga- 
tion. 
16. Though it seems to be a very simple 
procedure to form and appropriate names 
to denote properties separate from the otiier 
properties with which we see them con- 
nected in nature, the origin and appropria- 
tion of such names must have been very 
gradual ; and the contrivances which, in the 
natural progress of language, have been 
adopted to designate separate properties, are 
among the most curious procedures of the art 
of mutual communication. Mr. H. Tooke, 
who has indisputably conducted us further 
towards an acquaintance with the causes of 
language than any other author on gram- 
mar, considers abstract terms as (generally 
speaking) “ participles or adjectives used 
without any substantive to which they can 
be joined.” “ Such words,” he observes 
(Epea Pteroenta, vol. ii. p. 17) “ compose 
the bulk of every language. In English, 
those which are borrowed from Ihe Latin, 
French, and Italian are easily recognized, 
because those languages are sufficiently fa- 
miliar to us, and not so familiar as our own : 
those from the Greek are more striking; 
because more unusual: but those which are 
original in our own language have been al- 
most wholly overlooked, and are quite un- 
suspected.” A large proportion of the nouns 
which he thus traces, are certainly not to 
be considered as abstract terms, according 
to what appears to be the customary mearn 
ing of that appellation, (such as view, the 
past part of voir, something seen ; tent, the 
past participle from tendo, something stretch- 
ed:) and others certainly require more ex- 
planation than he has thought right to give, 
(for instance, providence, prudence, innocence, 
and all the rest of the tribe of qualities in 
ence and ance, which he considers as the 
neuter plurals of the present participles of 
riders, nocere, &c. without shewing us why 
things foreseeing, or things not hurting, have 
acquired the force of the above words :) but 
a considerable number of his derivations 
are very satisfactory, and give great insight 
in to the procedures of language. A few may 
be adduced as a specimen of his etymologies. 
Skill is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon 
verb pcylan, to divide, to make a difference, to 
discern ; and it signifies that faculty by which 
things are properly divided or separated one 
from another. Sorrow is the past parti- 
ciple of j-yppan, to vex, to cause mischief 
to, and is the general name for anv thing by 
which one is vexed, grieved, or mischieved. 
Wrath is the past participle of y piSan, to 
writhe. Heat is the past participle of J.ae- 
tan, to make hot. Doom is the past parti- 
ciple of oeman, to judge, to decree. 
IT. Another class of abstract nouns, viz. 
