PARK AND CCAETPRY. 
281 
member of my family, who, when he was dying, 
asked that his wife and children should refrain from 
wearing anything which savored of mourning at his 
passing. It was difficult to do; the heart seemed 
to prompt otherwise. But it was done, and the 
wisdom of my father’s dying wish has often come 
home to his survivors when they have seen the cus- 
tom followed which has made relatives and friends 
sombre just to look at each other .” — Western 
Undertaker. 
Legal. 
LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL DISINTERMENT. 
A decision of the utmost importance has been 
recently rendered by the supreme court of Utah in 
the case of Thickfield v. Mountain View Cemetery 
Association. This was an action to recover da- 
mages from the association for entering upon a lot 
which it had sold, and disinterring the body of a 
dead child, and interring the body of a stranger 
therein. A judgement for $i , i 50 and costs was 
obtained. 
The lot referred to was sold in 1889, without 
any deed being given for it. In 1891 the associ- 
ation made another sale of it, for $16, giving the 
purchaser a written instrument therefore, which se- 
cond purchaser had the remains of his child buried 
therein. Shortly after, the first purchaser discov- 
ered what had been done, and thereupon made 
complaint to the secretary of the association, who 
promised to remove the body of the child. Some- 
thing more than a year after its interment, it was 
removed and interred in an adjoining lot, while the 
mother of the first purchaser of the lot was buried 
therein. No notice of the removal was given to 
the parent of the dead child. 
Under these circumstances, the supreme qourt 
affirms the judgment rendered below. The court 
says it will be observed that no opportunity was 
afforded the child’s father, or any of his friends, to 
witness the removal and reinterment, so that he 
might know of his own positive knowledge the fin- 
al resting place of his child. The removal had been 
in contemplation for a year, and yet during all that 
time no attempt was made to confer with him. He 
was treated by the cemetery association as though 
by the interring of his child he had lost, not only 
all rights to its body, but also to the lot which he 
had purchased. This was no assumption warrant- 
ed by the law, while it is true that after burial the 
dead body of the child was not the subject of pro- 
perty, but became a part of the ground to which it 
was committed, — “Earth to earth, ashes to ashes, 
dust to dust,” — still the cemetery association had 
no right to break the parent’s inclosure with impu- 
nity, and, as appears, regardless of the mental suf- 
ferings which such an act would produce on the 
part of the father, to whom the dead was sacred, 
remove the remains, without his knowledge .or con- 
sent. One who thus negligently disturbs the re- 
mains of the dead after burial does so at his peril; 
and the degree of his liability will be in accordance 
with the degree of negligence, or willfulness, or 
wantonness. 
From an examination of the evidence in this 
case, continues the court, the conclusion is irresis- 
tible that the trespass was willful, being character- 
ized by a wanton and reckless disregard of the 
rights of the father of the child. In estimating 
the damages, the jury had a right to take into con- 
sideration, not only the injury to the property, 
which was comparatively trifling, but also the in- 
jured feelings of the father. In such a case 
aggravated damages are allowable because of the 
wantonness of the injury, which might have been 
averted by ordinary regard for human feelings or 
mental suffering. 
Complaint was also made by the association 
that the verdict in this case was excessive. But 
the sup-eme court says that it is unable to conclude 
that the damages are so exorbitant as to warrant a 
reversal of the case. The judgment of the jury, 
and not the opinion of the court, must govern, un- 
less the facts disclosed by the evidence show that 
the jury was misled by some mistaken view of the 
merits of the case, or were under the influence of 
partiality, passion, or prejudice. And the jury 
must necessarily be permitted to exercise a wide 
discretion. 
BOUND TO PAY FOR COPING. 
There was coping around one of the lots in a 
cemetery which so pleased a certain lady that she 
authorized a party to have it constructed around her 
lot similar to and of the same quality of material as 
the other. In order to get bids for the work, this 
agent prepared a sketch and some specifications for 
the coping. The lowest bid thereof, $470, was 
accepted. The lady told her agent to have the 
work done, saying to him: “You go on and do 
as you would for yourself.” The work was done, 
and the coping was like that around the other lot, 
and of the same quality of material. She saw it 
just before it was completed, and expressed herself 
satisfied. Subsequently she refused to pay for it, 
apparently because a discharged employe of the 
contractors told her that the rock used was "Loom- 
is granite,” instead of ’’Penryn granite,” which the 
agent erronouesly supposing had been used in the 
other coping had called for in his specifications. 
But the contract for the work was a verbal one, 
to duplicate the other job, and when told that 
“Loomis granite” would be used the agent agreed 
