PARK AND CE/AETERY. 
339 
In tendering his resignation- as superintendent of Woodland 
cemetery, to the Cemetery Committee of the city Council of 
Des Moines, la., Mr. T. B. Robinson, submitted in writing a 
number of suggestions, looking to the better regulation of cemet- 
ery affairs, necessary and immediate improvements, and changes 
in methods. Several of the recommendations were adopted 
with the prospect of all the suggestions being acted upon. From 
the tenor of the communication it would appear that like many 
other cemeteries managed by city common councils there is a 
lamentable lack of intelligent understanding of cemetery ethics, 
and this emphasizes the view that special committees should be 
appointed, where cemeteries are under municipal control, whose 
sole duties should be to care for the properties relegated to their 
management. 
Legal, 
MONUMENT LIEN LAW HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A lien for $i ,363.67, balance of purchase price 
remaining unpaid on monument set up in Green- 
wood Cemetery, Brooklyn, New York, with interest 
from August 10, 1894, was sought to be established 
under the New York law of 1888. This statute de- 
clares that every person, firm, corporation, or asso- 
ciation that shall furnish or place in any cemetery 
or burial ground any monument, grave stone, in- 
closure, or other structure may at any time, or with- 
in one year after the bill for the same becomes due, 
file with the superintendent or person in charge of 
such cemetery or burial ground notice in writing, 
signed by the vendor, to the effect that he claims a 
lien on the same for the purchase price thereof or 
such portion of the purchase price as remains un- 
paid, with interest. The superintendent or person 
in charge is to forthwith notify the owner of the plot 
of the filing of such notice of lien. In case the a- 
mount due be not paid within six months after the 
service of the notice on the plot owner, the person 
claiming such lien shall within 60 days have the 
right, on 10 days’ notice to the superintendent or 
person in charge to remove the monument or other 
structure from the cemetery or burial ground, and 
shall advertise and sell the same at public auction 
to the higest bidder, to satisfy the lien. Because 
it deems the statute authorizes the taking of proper- 
ty without due process of law, which not only re- 
quires that notice shall be given to the person 
whose property is to be taken, but he shall have 
an opportunity to be heard before a court or pro- 
perly constituted tribunal in a trial conducted accord- 
ing to law, the special term of the supreme court o^ 
New York City holds the statute unconstitutional 
and void. Not only so, but it also holds the owner 
of the lot entitled to a perpetual injunction against 
the parties seeking to enforce a lien under the sta- 
tute, restraining them and their agents and servants 
from interfering with the monument in question. 
Under a valid law, creating a lien of this character^ 
it would seem from what the court further saysr 
that from its very nature it would be so repulsive to 
the courts that they would permit no presumption 
in favor of those claiming a lien under it: and, un- 
less they complied strictly with the requirements of 
the statute, if valid to serve on the owner 
of the lot a copy of the lien filed with the superin- 
tendent, without notifying him that the lien had 
been filed with the superintendent, and when. 
RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA TOMBS. 
While American law is regarded generally as a 
developement of the English common law, Louisi- 
ana has a code founded on the civil law adopted by 
France. This apparently makes quite a difference 
as to certain rights in tombs and burial lots. The 
decision of the supreme court of Louisiana in the 
recent case of Choppin v. Labranche, will illustrate 
this. It maintains that cemetery lots do not part 
with the character of immovable property because 
devoted to burial purposes, and that the Lou- 
isiana code completely effaces the distinction of 
‘ things holy, sacred, and religious.” As a conse- 
quence, there can be no modification of ownership of 
burial lots. And there is no servitude, or legal 
right of use apart from the ownership, established 
on property for the interment of the dead. Now 
what must be the decision of a suit brought by near 
relatives of deceased persons to prevent their re- 
mains being removed from a tomb in which a friend 
who had erected same promised they should have 
their final resting place, by the widow and legatee of 
such friend, who became the sole owner ot the pro- 
perty with no form of subdivision of her ownership 
vested in any one else, and who proposed to sell 
the tomb? It is interesting to note how this court 
came to practically the same point, but by a wholly 
different way, as the courts of other states. It felt 
that, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable 
purposes, the sanctity of the grave should be main- 
tained. But the usual reasoning could not be fol- 
lowed. The promise of sepulture in the tomb had 
been made and the remains of his fiiends laid there- 
in during the lifetime and ownership of the party 
making the promise. The promise having been made 
and acted upon, the court found a basis for doing 
what it wanted to do, and held that, wholly irres- 
pective of any issue of title, neither the party who 
made the promise could have afterwards in his life- 
time recalled it nor could his legatee after his death, 
and require the removal of remains deposited on the 
faith of that pledge of final sepulture. Everything 
was rested on the promise. Consequently the 
court considered that all that could be done was to 
make the Injunction perpetual as to the removal of 
the remains of those thus placed in the tomb, and 
would not prohibit a sale of the tomb. 
