Studies in American History 
81 
to be branded as not only hostile to relief for poor debtors, 
but also an ally of both Virginia, to help defraud settlers of 
their land, and of the hated United States Bank. All this 
led to many exciting debates, more angry messages to the 
legislature from the next governor, and more legislative re- 
monstrances. Finally, in Bodley vs. Gaither, 1825, the court 
of appeals in Kentucky sustained the occupying-claimant laws 
of the state and thereby repudiated the Supreme Court's 
decisions above mentioned. Its action was based on the ground 
that the Supreme Court's decision had been reached by fewer 
than a majority of the members of the court. Let it be said 
that it was the “old court", in the meaning of that term which 
became so familiar later, that is, the anti-relief court, in Ken- 
tucky, which challenged the Supreme Court of the United 
States and which rendered the decision upholding the occupy- 
ing-claimant laws.^^^ The state, torn asunder on almost all 
other problems at this time, was a unit in opposition to what 
was regarded as foreign encroachment on her sovereignty 
from Virginia and the federal courts. 
The Supreme Court in 1831, Hawkins vs. Barney's Lessee, 
modified the position it had taken in Green vs. Biddle, and since 
the last decision was more favorable to Kentucky's contention 
on the proposition, it enabled Kentuckians to say that the 
Supreme Court had backed down and that their own views 
had been right all the time.^^^ A study of the case convinces 
one that the struggles over the occupying-claimant laws were 
much more than merely partisan, political wrangles, as Sum- 
ner implies. It must be admitted that Kentucky settlers 
whose titles were questioned often took unfair advantage of 
National Intelligencer, December 6, 1825; Sumner, Andrew Jackson, 168. 
Robertson, Scrap Book, 221. The terms “relief” and “anti-relief” were superseded 
as party names by the terms “old court” and “new court” when in 1824 a legislative 
act was passed repealing all laws relating to the organization of the court of appeals. 
The act provided not only for the abolishment of the existing court of appeals, which 
henceforth became known as the “old court”, but also for the removal of Judges Boyle, 
Owsley, and Mills, the old-court justices. The act further provided for the establish- 
ment of another court of appeals and for the appointment of new judges. The court 
of appeals might not under this reorganization law annul an act of the legislature 
except by the concurrence of all the judges of that court. In January, 1825, the 
governor appointed new judges for what at once became known as the “new court”. 
The “old-court” judges refused to admit the constitutionality of the act removing them 
and continued in office. For three years there were two courts of appeals in Ken- 
tucky, and the most exciting and bitter legislative-judicial controversy ever occurring 
in America ensued. When the “new-court” party lost control of the legislature, the 
act which had caused the turmoil was repealed and the “old court” with all its original 
powers was restored by the “old-court” party. 
Sumner, op. cit., 168-171. 
