Studies in American History 
271 
rains came these roads became almost impassable and the 
Union army nearly starved.®® 
Even before the battle of Chickamauga, Grant had been 
ordered to reenforce Rosecrans, but, owing to the delay in 
getting the dispatch, the shallowness of water in the Missis- 
sippi, and the bad condition of the railroad lines east of Vicks- 
burg and Memphis, the troops were slow in getting under 
way.®® Secretary Stanton was convinced that greater haste 
was necessary and urged that troops be sent from the Army 
of the Potomac to the aid of Rosecrans. He was able to per- 
suade the President to send Hooker with the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Corps. These were transported from Culpepper Court 
House to Washington by rail, transferred to the Baltimore 
and Ohio and carried via Wheeling, Columbus, Indianapolis, 
Louisville, and Nashville to Stevenson and Bridgeport, a dis- 
tance of 1,200 miles in a week.®' These forces arrived in 
October. In the meantime, Sherman was coming up with his 
four divisions from Memphis, but had to repair 300 miles of 
track as he advanced in order to maintain his communica- 
tions.®® With Grant in command of these combined forces 
Bragg was defeated and driven toward Dalton, Ga. 
Grant now went to Washington to superintend in person the 
operations against Richmond, leaving Sherman in command 
in the West. The latter started toward Atlanta on May 6, 
1864, with 99,000 men. Joseph E. Johnston was intrenched 
at Dalton, Ga., with 53,000 men. The disparity in numbers 
seemed to give Sherman a big advantage, but the roughness 
of the country and the constantly lengthening line of supply 
and a consequent dwindling of his main force thru detach- 
ments needed to protect this line put the two forces nearly on 
equal terms. By constant flanking and fighting Sherman 
gradually forced Johnston down the railroad line, since the 
dirt roads were so rough that the latter would not risk leaving 
the railroad. As they proceeded Sherman’s difficulties in- 
creased, for he was left with an ever-longer line to defend.®® 
Under such conditions Southern critics think Bragg should have forced Rosecrans 
to surrender. See W. E, Dodd, Jefferson Davis (Philadelphia, 1907), 316. 
Rhodes, Histo^-y of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, IV, 399. 
The Reminiscences of Carl Sohurz (3 vols.. New York, 1907-1908), III, 59; Pratt, 
Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 23-25. 
Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, IV, 399. 
On May 22 Sherman wrote from Kingston, “I am already within fifty miles of 
Atlanta, and have added 100 miles to my communications, every mile of which is liable 
to attack by cavalry.” 
