30 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE TEXAS ACADEMY OF SCIENCE. 
But here a warning is in place. Practically all who have studied the 
question explicitly state that animals are capable of voluntary action, 
and that children act voluntarily long before they are self-conscious; 
and they adduce evidence in support of their contention that it is not 
altogether easy to explain away. Romanes declares that no one dis- 
putes that, except for superior complexity, refinement, and foresight, 
human and animal will are identical in kind,* and attributes inten- 
tional use of language to animals as well as to man; and Preyerf finds 
will in the child long before self-consciousness. Suggesting the nature 
of the evidence, Professor Lloyd Morgan maintains that his terrier, 
who will not bite him during the exceedingly painful process of having 
a wound sewn up, exhibits will; another instance of will, given strangely 
enough hv Professor Baldwin (Mental Dev., p. 386), is that of a dog 
who, after the word is given, snaps “with a will” at tire much coveted 
savory morsel on his nose; Romanes, in his “Mental Intelligence,” also 
cites the case of an intelligent cebus, who unscrewed, and after many ‘ex- 
periments’ and ‘trials’ again screwed in the wooden handle of a hearth- 
broom. And there is plenty of evidence of the same kind, though none, 
I think, that essentially strengthens the contention that animals will. 
As against this evidence it may be remarked, in the first place, that 
in this field mistakes are easy to make, and in fact have been made. 
All instinctive actions actually serve a purpose, and it is easier than 
not to look on them as intended to do so. Add that until recently it 
has been exceedingly difficult to sav what volition is with any pre- 
cision; on that point suggestions will be made presently explaining the 
efficacy of effort as similar to, though vastly more momentous than, 
the efficacy of other feelings. And finally, neither the writers quoted, 
nor, as far as I know, any others, have seriously raised the question as 
to whether volition might not be the distinguishing characteristic. 
Further, as Baldwin points out in the case Preyer cites as one of 
volition in the child’s fifth or sixth month, viz., holding the head erect, 
and in many cases of volition attributed to animals, the facts can be 
easily explained on simpler hypotheses. In Preyer’s child, the holding 
up of the head is due to a reflex that ripens gradually after birth. In- 
stead of saying that will power restrains Morgan’s terrier from biting 
him, the presence of his master and the dog’s affection for him is suffi- 
cient. Instead of anthropomorphising Baldwin’s dog, and maintaining 
that when allowed he snaps “with a will,” or, a more plausible conten- 
tion, that up to that time he exercises effortful self-control, it is only 
necessary to point out that the trick is either one already habitual with 
* Loc. cit., pp. 8 and 88; cf. Lloyd Morgan, loc. cit., pp. 416 sq. and 459. sq. 
f Mind of the Child, Eng. tr. p. 264 sq. 
