49 
THE MAMMALIA- 
the entire Animal Kingdom. It is tlion wo shall perceive that the Quadrumana and 
Carnassiors, which stand at the head of the list, may almost he styled Intellectual, if 
compared-to animals of the lower divisions, whoso entire existence appears to he sway- 
ed by a uniform and constant force. Indeed, were not all analogies between mental 
and material phenomena altogether inadmissible, we would be disposed to compare tho 
Instincts of the inferior animals to those inert powers of Nature which form the prime 
movers of our own machinery. The most complicated Instinct of the Dog, requir- 
ing for its fulfilment the concurrence of the greatest number of intelligent acts, appears 
absolutely nothing in comp,ari3on to actions of this nature, which may he seen in tho 
Invertebratod animals, but chiefly among the Insects. In the Dog and other Mam- 
malia of tho higher orders, that Instinct which urges them to store up provisions for' 
future want, shows itself only in a few isolated acts. Among tho Insects, on the con- 
trary, their entire existence, however varied it may appear, seems composed only of 
one single invariable action, from which nothing external can divert them, and to which 
they seem invincibly urged by a superior power. None of the Mammalia exhibit in 
any of their actions such a combination of 3ag.acity, foresight, ,and skill, as might have 
been inferred from the industry of the Bee, did wo not sec in its actions, proofs of the 
existence of a Mind not its own, M^ero Man incapable of receiving evidence of a 
Creative Power in his own constitution, he must read it in that primiiplo which urges 
these lower animals to perform a complicated course of actions, continuing for days 
and months, — ever directed to one end, and that end invtiriably the same. He must 
Jtcrccive that Wisdom is not the sole property of Man, when ho finds profound com- 
binations, calculations of the greatest complexity, and tho most ingenious views, urging 
these lower animals to work with a degree of perfection which all his learning and 
experience, accumulated for a long course of ages, can scarcely equal. 
.\lthough we have said that Intelligent actions may be varied at the jdeasure of the 
animal, while, the Instinctive actions are irresistible, these assertions must bo under- 
stood with some qualification. While performing an Instinctive action, the animal 
always preserves tho power of using its senses, .and of exercising its Intelligence to tho 
degree natural to its species, and employs both in the manner most favorable for the 
execution of that Instinctive action to which it is actuated. 
•An animal is capable of exercising its Intelligence in a degree inversely proportional 
to the force of its Instinct. As the Instinctive wants become urgent, its Intelli- 
gence appears more fettered. 'I'heie is no comjrarisou, for e.xample, in the degree of 
Instinctive force between tho Hamster (Crtce/«»), which stores up magazines of pro- 
visions for the whiter, mid the Dog who hides his superabundant food. Nothing 
could divert, the H.imster from its purjiosc ; the slightest circumstance would cause 
tho Dog to neglect that precaution. 
Having pointed out the dilfercnce between Intelligent and Instinctive actions, we 
now come to draw the probable line of demarcation between the Intellectual powers 
of Man, and the Intelligence of the lower animals. 
We evidently perceive that animals, especially the higher classes, have the power of 
Attention ; that their senses receive impressions analogous to those we are conscious 
of experiencing in ourselves ; that their ideas follow each other in a certain regular 
order constituting a train of thought ; that a former idea can he recalled ; that their 
ideas are variously associated ; and that they can form some conclusions. This seems 
to ho the extent of their powers. We are, of course, reduced merely to conjecturo 
the intensity or qualities of their sensations or pereejitions, and are therefore unable 
to point out those qualities of tjodies which can ho perceived by Man alone. 
There is, however, one curious circumstance which may bo noticed in regard to the 
sense of Hearing. With animals it is a Sensation and not a Perception ; in other words, 
they are unable to refer sounds to an external cause. If a wild Bull or Horse feel 
himself struck violently, he makes no mistake os to tlie cause. He rushes immediately 
at tho person who has inflicted the blow, even when struck only with a stone nr other 
projectile, just as the Wild-Buar rushes upon tho Hunter, whoso ritlo-ball has struck 
him. But when captive animals, in course of taming, are tormented by a Drum or 
Trumpet to prevent them from sleeping, they have no perception cither of the in- 
strument from which tho sound proceeds, or of the person who plays it. They suffer 
passively, as if by some internal injury, where the cause of tho evil is within them- 
selves. It is curious that their head and ears are notwithstanding directed instantane- 
ously to tho precise quarter whenoo the sound proceeds. It is different wiih tho 
sensation of Colour. Tho Bull rushes at a piece of red cloth, in tho same manner as ho 
Would have done at an assailant ; from which we may infer, that when the Horse and 
Bull are unable to refer a .Sound to its proper cause, it is owing less to the distance 
wliioh separates them from tho instrument, than to the peculiar nature of their sense 
of Hearing. 
In other respects, they generally seem to have the same senses as ourselves, and 
to perceive analogous qualities in bodies. Their motions result from the qualities 
of their seu-sations; tiiey attempt to fly, to defend themselves, to seize, or to attack, 
iecording as they are moved by pleasure or pain. 
Being csp.ihle of forming certain relations to Man of a benevolent or malevolent 
character, they acquire a marked affection for those who treat them well, and a de- 
termined hatred to their tormentors. Some species form an attachment for each 
other solely from the habit of living together for some time, and frequently their 
mutual hatred arises from mere caprice. 
Tliese dispositions presuppose Mnniory, and at least some confused knowledge of 
the relations of thoso qualities which distinguish one person from another. They 
exhibit the internal affection of tlie moment by external signs, which are in general 
I'ery like those employed by Mall for tha same purpose. 
The Mammalia acquire from experience a certain knowledge of natural objects, of 
fiiosc which are safe or dangerous; they avoid the latter in consequence of this ex- 
perience, and of that memory from which it is derived, without being determined by 
mi Instinctive Attraction or Kepulsloii. This experience enables them to infer tha 
eenscquonce of their own conduct, when domesticated. They know that a certain ac- 
tion will be punished by their master, and that a contrary one will be rewarded. 
Their final determination does not proceed from any internal attraction, but often in 
direct opposition to some very powerful Instinct, and from the sole knowledge of the re« 
-MAN AND BEASTS. 
tvard or punishment which will follow. This knowledge, besides memory, also pre- 
supposes a power of reasoning from analogy, or of inferring that similar causes produce 
similar effects. Knowing well the power of their master, that ho can cither punish 
them or not, they assume before him a supplicating air, on perceiving him to be 
angry. 
Their passions and emotions react upon their involuntary functions in precisely tlie 
Same manner as with 5Ian. Surprise stops their respiration ; they tremble with Fear ; 
Terr-ir throws them into a cold perspiration; and Love agitates their frames. 
■ They may be corrupted or improved by Domestication. Habits of ease or luxury 
create in them artificial wants unknown in the fields or woods. Education may fit 
them for actions for which they are not adapted by their structure. By proper 
training they may be rendered docile, mild, and active; or, if improperly managed, 
they may become more obstinate, passionate, stubborn, or lazy, than Nature had formed 
them. 
Ilacc Horses give evident proofs that they are actuated by Emulation, and Dogs 
dispute with each other for tho caresses of their master. The .Toalousy of tlie latter 
does not merely relate to the possession of their food or other enjoyments wholly 
physical, but also to tlie benevolent affections. 
' The natural language of the Mammalia enables them to explain to each other the 
wants or sensations of the moment, and, in their intercourse with Man, they understand 
that more complicated language by wliich he makes known his commands. Not only 
do tho young know the cry of their mother when she gives notice of approaching 
danger, but they coiiiprchend a number of artificial words used by Man, and act 
in consequence. We have been acquainted with a gentleman who spoke to his Dog 
<tnly in the French language. The animal would go home, or leave the room at his' 
master s command if announced in the common phrase, but would remain unde- 
cided and look into his face with eyes of inquiry when the order was given in an 
unusual style or language. Some species and genera have very great powers of Imi- 
tation. 
Tliero can be no doubt that all the lower animals, without exception, are nneonseious 
of their existence, and incapable of reflecting upon their own condition. They cannot 
lurii their thoughts within themselves, and consider what it is that they see, feel, think, 
and perform. The acts of their Minds, like the inoveraents of their bodies, are the 
mere result of external causes or of internal Instincts. They cannot form the notion 
of Liberty, for this can only be acquired by Reflection. For the same reason, they 
are not Moral and accountable creatures. . ' 
Indeed, it is chiefly to tho want of Abstraction — of that power by which Man forms 
general ideas, and arrives at general conclusions, that tho inferiority of the lower ani- 
mals may be attributed. 
Many philosopliera, and especially Condillac, imagined that animals can reflect; 
and they founded their views upon those invariable actions which wo have regarded 
as Instinctive. But there appears to he an evident contradiction, in attributing a 
constant and seemingly necessary action to a power such as reflection, which presup- 
poses Liberty. It is also evident, that if the Dog concealed h'ls food from really fore-- 
seeing the chance of future want, or, in other words, from reflecting upon his former 
necessity, and considering the probability of its recurrence, he would not have confined 
himself merely to set aside a supply of provisions, but would have taken means to- 
provide shelter, a manger — in a word, to procure a supply for satisfying all his wants. 
This method of reasoning is condusivo against our regarding Instinctive actions, which 
are always partial and limited in their application, as the result of Reflection. 
■ Other philosophers, imagining that the power of Reflection was usually proportion- 
ed to the force of their original desires, thouglit tliat tlie Instincts of animals might 
still be owing to Reflection, as tlicy might depend for their exercise upon the force of 
the wanls or likings of tho animal. But if this were the case, the results of Beflcction 
would be seen in their most trifling attachments or likings, as well as in their most 
pressing wants ; and this docs not agree with observed facta. It is certain, that, for 
animals generally to satisfy their appetite for food is of the greatest importance, 
and exercises tlie most powerful influence over each individual. Also it appears much 
■ more indispensable for their existence that it should be satisfied than the want of 
slielter. Yet we see many animals continuing to dig barrows and retreats, or, accord- 
ing to this theory, appearing to foresee the necessity of providing aheUer, and yet tho 
same animals do not foresee that which ought to be most urgent with them, the neces- 
sity of laying by a supply of food for future use. 
All other attempts to explain tho actions of animals in a general manner, and 
without admitting particular faculties, are equally objectionable, and tho same thing- 
may be observed in reference to Instinctive actions. 
To avoid tho contradictions which have been here pointed out, some philosophers 
have thought that tho Instinctive actions of animals proceeded from some peculiar 
form of tlie Brain. When stated in tlie above simple form, this theory presents- 
roany difficulties. Its partisans have pointed out what they coneeivo to he tho par- 
ticular foniis which manifest Instincts, and have collected many striking coincidences 
in support of tlieir viows. 'Wo find, it is true, in tlie structure of their brains certain 
forms which are in some manner connected with the Intelligent functions; but their 
experiments have not yet demonstrated these functions, and the extreme difficulty of 
such a task will long render it almost impossible. . In the meantime, it is useless to 
occupy ourselves with suppositions, which are ever liable tube overturned by future 
inquiries. Natural History justly cxeluiles all consideration of that question, oiiee so 
much agitated in the schools — Whether animals have .Souls. 
There is a class of phenomena very different from the preceding, which are founded 
on more certain analogies, and throw some light upon the connexion between IiitellL- 
genco and Instinct. ^Ve allude to the remarkable effects of Habit iu tri-insforming an 
Intelligent into an Instinctive action. 
When a Man, who has perhaps studied with great care some treatise on the Art of 
Horsemanship, attempts for the first time to mount a Horse, none of his attitudes or 
movements, notwithstanding all his science, are what they ought to be. His body 
falls behind or before when it should ho in a vertical position. His limbs aro shaken 
when they ought to remain motiquless. In a word, there exists no liarmouv between 
