THE ISLAND OF CEYLON. 
3f)8 
strengthened by the Swiss regiment of De Mcuron ; but un- 
fortunately for the Dutch the term of its services expired 
at the critical season of danger ; and by an unaccountable 
oversight in policy, this line body of troops were permitted, on 
greater advantages being held out to them, to transfer their 
services to their most dangerous enemies, and to co-operate 
powerfully in the reduction of their former masters. 
This military establishment of the Dutch, which rarely 
exceeded five thousand men in all, was found sufficient to repel 
the attacks of the native Princes. It was also capable, from 
the nature of the country, of completely baffling the attempts 
of any European force that did not much exceed in number 
the troops stationed at any particular point. But it is evi- 
dent, from the great extent of the island, that this small 
force was obliged to be too much scattered, to be capable 
of making any effectual resistance against a numerous enemy. 
When the depth of water on the eastern shore is considered, 
as well as the facility afforded for landing by the spacious 
harbour of Trincomalee, it is impossible that a sufficient 
number of 'troops for the defence of this quarter could have 
been spared from the protection of the rich countries, on 
the south-west, which were menaced by an enemy ready to 
make a descent from the coast immediately opposite. The 
difficulty of communication likewise requires the force em- 
ployed to be the greater, as it is next to impossible to march 
troops from one side of the island to the other, in time to 
render each other any effectual support, 
3 
