TIIE ISLAND OF CEYLON. s6g 
But it is not the defence of the island itself alone that 
should induce us always to maintain a powerful force here. 
From its situation, it affords the best point for stationing 
those troops which are destined to protect our several es- 
tablishments in India, and to act as a constant check on 
the native princes. On the Coromandel coast in particular, 
where our possessions have of late been so much extended, 
troops may arrive from Ceylon in a day or two, and by 
this means preclude the possibility of our settlements being 
overrun by surprise before a sufficient force could be col- 
lected to oppose the invader. During the disturbances which 
arose on the borders of Tinivelly and Madura, my at- 
tention was forcibly called to this subject by the events 
which took place there. Owing to the small number of 
troops stationed at that time in Ceylon, it was found im- 
possible to co-operate from thence with those sent by the 
company to repress the commotions ; and before a sufficient 
force could be brought together from other quarters for 
this purpose, several officers and a great number of sol- 
diers were killed and wounded. Had a large force been 
at that period stationed in Ceylon, the disturbances might 
have been almost immediately quelled. 
Troops may be sent to any of our possessions in the 
peninsula of India from Ceylon at a less expense, and in 
much shorter time, than from either of the presidencies of 
Bombay or Madras. Since we have been in possession of 
the island* detachments have at various times been sent with 
3 B 
