184 ' Contemporary Agricultural Law. 
from the cows, and they dismissed the summons. On appeal 
to the Divisional Court it was held that the case should go 
back to the Justices with a direction to convict unless 
further evidence were called before them which they ought 
to hear bearing upon the question of whether or not the 
difference between the quantities of fat in the two con- 
signments was consistent with ordinary milking. The 
evidence already offered as to the difference in the two 
consignments was held insufficient to relieve the farmer from 
liability for deficiency in fat of the sample in respect of which 
he was summoned. In a Scottish case of Scott v. Jack (1912, 
S.C. (J.) 87) on a similar prosecution for selling milk not 
containing the required percentage of milk fat, the view taken 
by the Court is hardly reconcilable with the last case. It was 
there proved that it had not been tampered with or adulterated, 
but had been sold in the same condition as yielded by the 
cows, and that the deficiency of milk fat and solids was due to 
the method of feeding which had been purposely adopted to 
produce quantity of milk irrespective of quality. It was held 
that the milk was “ genuine ” within the Sale of Milk Regula- 
tions, 1901, and that the accused was not guilty of the offence 
charged, and the Judges commented adversely on the decision 
of Smithies v. Bridge (71 L.J.K.B., 555 ; 1902, 2 K.B., 13) 
where a milk seller was convicted of an offence against the 
Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, when the milk had not 
been tampered with or adulterated, but was found deficient in 
milk fat in consequence of the length of time which had 
elapsed since the cow had last been milked. That case 
however, arose before the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, 
were in force. 
5. Game. In Leivorthy v. Rees (77 J.P., 268 ; 29 Times 
L.R., 408) it was held that the restriction in Section 6 of the 
Ground Game Act, 1880, that “ no person having a right of 
killing ground game under this Act or otherwise . . . shall 
for the purpose of killing ground game employ spring traps 
except in rabbit holes ” does not apply to an occupying owner 
of land or to a person authorised by him in writing to kill and 
take ground game. Such persons may set traps for ground game 
where they please on land in their own occupation. In the 
Scottish case of Nicoll v. Strachan (1913, S.C. (J.) 18) a game- 
keeper shot a rabbit in the public road, and the rabbit then ran 
into private ground, and there fell dead or moribund. The 
shooter sent his dog into the private ground to retrieve the 
rabbit. It was held that he did not commit a trespass “ in 
search or pursuit of conies ” within the meaning of Section 1 
of the Game (Scotland) Act, 1832, which corresponds with 
Section 30 of the English Game Act, 1831. 
