Conscience, in Animals . 
*47 
1876.J 
the human race considered as a whole. But if the moral 
sense has been developed in the way here supposed, its root- 
principle must be that which has reference to ideas of no 
higher abstraction than those of parent, neighbour, or tribe. 
Now, even in this its most rudimentary phase of develop- 
ment, conscience pre-supposes a comparatively high order 
of intelligence as the prime condition of its possibility. 
For not only does the faculty as above defined require a good 
memory as a condition essential to its existence, but— -what 
is of much greater importance — it also requires the power 
of reflecting upon past conduct ; and this, it is needless to say, 
appears to be a much rarer quality in the psychology of 
animals than is mere memory. 
Thus, if Mr. Darwin’s theory concerning the origin and 
development of the moral sense is true, we should not expert 
to find any indications of this faculty in any animals that 
are too low in the psychological scale to be capable of re- 
flecting upon their past conduct. Whether this limitation 
does not exclude all animals whatever is a question with 
which I am not here concerned. I merely assert that if the 
theory in question is the true one, and if no animals are 
capable of reflecting upon their past conduct, then no ani- 
mals can possess a moral sense, properly so-called. And 
from this of course it follows that if any animals can be shown 
to possess a moral sense, they are thereby also shown to be 
capable of reflecting upon their past conduct. 
Again, if Mr. Darwin’s theory concerning the origin and 
development of the moral sense is true, it is self-evident 
that we should not expeCt to find any indications of this 
faculty in animals that are either unsocial or unsympa- 
thetic. Supposing the theory true, therefore, our search for 
animals in which we may expeCt to find any indications of 
a moral sense is thus seen to be very restricted in its range : 
we can only expeCt to find such indications in animals that 
are highly intelligent, social, and sympathetic. Since by 
the hypothesis conscience requires a comparatively rare 
collocation of conditions for its development, we must expeCt 
to find it a comparatively rare product. 
Lastly, as it is quite certain that no animal is capable of 
reflecting upon past conduCt in any high degree, and as we 
have just seen that the moral sense depends upon the faculty 
of so reflecting, it follows that we cannot expeCt to find any 
animal in which the moral sense attains any high degree of 
development. 
We are now in a position to draw some important dis- 
tinctions. There are several instincts and feelings which, 
