Conscience in Animals . 
[April, 
148 
when expressed in outward adtion, more or less simulate 
conscience (so to speak), but which it would be erroneous 
to call by that name. For instance, the maternal instindt, 
although it leads in many cases to severe and sustained 
self-denial for the benefit of the offspring, is nevertheless 
clearly distinct from conscience. The mother in tending 
her young does so in obedience to an inherited instindt, and 
not from any fear of subsequent self-reproach if she leaves 
her family to perish. She follows the maternal instinct, so 
long as it continues in operation, just as she would follow 
any other instinct ; and it is, as it were, a mere accident of 
the case that in this particular instance the course of adtion 
which the instindt prompts is a course of adtion which is 
conducive to the welfare of others. An illustration will 
render this distinction more clear. In his chapter on the 
“ Moral Sense ” Mr. Darwin alludes to the conflidt of in- 
stindts which sometimes occurs in swallows when the 
migratory season overtakes a late brood of young birds ; at 
such times “ swallows, house martins, and swifts frequently 
desert their tender young, leaving them to perish miserably 
in their nests.” And further on he remarks — “ When ar- 
rived at the end of their long journey, and the migratory 
instindt has ceased to adt, what an agony of remorse the 
bird would feel, if, from being endowed with great mental 
adtivity, she could not prevent the image constantly passing 
through her mind, of her young ones perishing in the bleak 
north from cold and hunger.” In other words, if we could 
suppose the mother bird under such circumstances to be 
capable of reflecting upon her past conduct, and as a consequence 
suffering an “ agony of remorse,” then the bird might properly 
be said to be conscience-stricken. And if v/e could suppose 
the bird, while still brooding over her young ones, to foresee 
the agony of remorse she would subsequently feel if she now 
yields to the stronger instindt by deserting her young, then 
the bird might properly be said to be adting conscientiously. 
Again, mere fear of punishment must not be confused 
with conscience — it being of the essence of conscientious 
adtion that it should be prompted by feelings wholly distindt 
from fear of retaliation by the objedt of injury, whether by 
way of punishment or revenge. Conscience must be capable 
of effedting its own punishment if violated ; otherwise the 
principle of adtion, whatever it may be, must be called by 
some other name.* 
* Of course I recognise fear of punishment as an important factor in the 
original constitution of the moral sentiment ; but, for reasons stated at the end 
of this article, we must, when treating of animal psychology, eliminate this 
fa&or when conscience has become sufficiently developed to be “ a law to itself 
