Nature's Scavengers . 
I 57 
1876.] 
to observe what had occurred, and waited to see what would 
happen next. For fully a quarter of an hour this terrier 
remained under the sofa without making a sound, but doubt- 
less enduring an agony of contending feelings. Eventually, 
however, conscience came off victorious, for, emerging from 
his place of concealment and carrying in his mouth the 
stolen chop, he came across the room and laid the tempting 
morsel at my feet. The moment he dropped the stolen 
property he bolted again under the sofa, and from this retreat 
no coaxing could charm him for several hours afterwards. 
Moreover, when during that time he was spoken to or patted, 
he always turned away his head in a ludicrously con- 
science-stricken manner. Altogether I do not think it 
would be possible to imagine a more satisfactory exhibition 
of conscience by an animal than this ; for it must be re- 
membered, as already stated, that the particular animal in 
question was never beaten in its life.* 
II. NATURE’S SCAVENGERS. 
N these days of Sanitary Reform it may be interesting 
to examine what is the real state and value of existing 
natural arrangements for the removal of nuisances, and 
for the disinfection of the waters and the atmosphere. The 
subject may, fortunately, now be discussed without calling 
forth those strong expressions of affeCIed disgust with which 
it would have been greeted not many years ago. It has a 
very obvious praCI ical bearing : we have to consider what 
is the aCtual utility of Nature’s Scavengers, — in how far 
we may trust to their aCtion, — when and where we should 
assist and cherish them, and under what circumstances we 
should seek to supersede them altogether. Nor is the ques- 
tion without a speculative interest. The efficiency and 
completeness, or the opposite qualities of Nature’s agencies 
for dealing with refuse, may throw some valuable cross-lights 
upon the origin of species, and indeed upon the whole debate 
* This latter point is most important because, although the moral sentiment 
in its incipient stages undoubtedly depends in a large measure upon fear of 
punishment, still in its more developed state this sentiment is as undoubtedly 
independent of such fear (Cf. Bain, “ Mental and Moral Science,” pp. 456-9, 
1875) ; and forasmuch as in our analysis of animal psychology we can be 
guided only by the study of outward adtions, and forasmuch as the course of 
adtion prompted by diredt fear of punishment will nearly always be identical 
with that prompted by true conscience, it is of the first importance to obtain 
cases such as the above, in which mere dread of punishment cannot even be 
suspedted to have been the motive urinciple of adtion. 
