216 Biological Controversy and its Laws . [April, 
consider that domestic animals have been found capable of 
understanding words addressed to them, or merely uttered 
in their presence, of a more complicated nature than a mere 
command, and where the tone and gestures of the speaker 
cou^ supply no clue to the meaning of the speaker.* Now 
we consider it self-evident that a being absolutely devoid of 
language, and therefore not fitted for receiving communica- 
tions from without through any such medium, could at all 
understand the language of man. Mr. Mivart would pro- 
bably pronounce all such instances 44 sensational,” and seek 
to get rid of them by the very compendious process of 
denial — the way in which inconvenient fadts are commonly 
treated by men of 44 first principles.” We hold, however, 
that cases of this nature are far too numerous and too well 
established to be thus summarily dismissed. That the 
words were actually understood was shown by the events, 
and the events are generally recorded by observers who had 
no theory either to defend or to overthrow. 
The languages of animals may, doubtless, be poor in ab- 
stract terms ; but even Prof. Max Muller admits that in 
human languages abstractions are expressed by words ori- 
ginally concrete in their meaning. Coleridge was of opinion 
that thought and language were not necessarily connected, 
and that, had the latter never originated, mankind might 
have been able to reason without it, and perhaps in a su- 
perior manner. The reasoning process in animals may thus 
be conducted without anything equivalent to words. 
It must be further considered that language does establish 
a break much lower down in the animal kingdom. There 
are animals which have demonstrable organs of hearing, 
which possess voices, or instead are endowed with delicate 
instruments for communicating their meaning by signs. 
On the other hand, there are other animals which have 
neither voices nor organs for exchanging signs, nor, as far 
as we can observe, any auditory apparatus. Surely, then, 
if we are to take 44 language ” as the test, there is a greater 
gap, a more complete break, between such absolutely dumb 
animals and those which can at all events call to each 
other. Surely there is a wider difference between 44 nothing ” 
and 44 something ” than between 44 something ” and a greater 
and more perfect something. The difference of kind, ac- 
cording to the language criterion, does not fall between man 
and apes, but between the higher animals — man included — 
and certain of the very lowest. We strike out, therefore, 
at once, the first of Mr. Mivart’s three points. 
* See Quarterly Journal of Science, v., 70, 71. 
