ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 
41 
cut, smooth, shape out, or bore wood with; but that, these 
things being made, no matter with what design, or whether 
with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they were ap¬ 
plicable to his purpose, and turned them to account. 
But, again. So far as this solution is attempted to be ap¬ 
plied to those parts of animals, the action of which does 
not depend upon the will of the animal, it is fraught with 
still more evident absurdity. Is it possible to believe that 
the eye was formed without any regard to vision; that it 
was the animal itself which found out, that, though formed 
with no such intention, it would serve to see with; and 
that the use of the eye, as an organ of sight, resulted from 
this discovery, and the animal’s application of it? The same 
question may be asked of the ear; the same of all the 
senses. None of the senses fundamentally depend upon 
the election of the animal; consequently, neither upon his 
sagacity, nor his experience. It is the impression which 
objects make upon them, that constitutes their use. Under 
that impression, he is passive. He may bring objects to the 
sense, or within its reach; he may select these objects: but 
over the impression itself he has no power, or very little; 
and that properly is the sense. 
Secondly, There are many parts of animal bodies which 
seem to depend upon the will of the animal in a greater 
degree than the senses do, and yet, with respect to which, 
this solution is equally unsatisfactory. If we apply the so¬ 
lution to the human body, for instance, it forms itself into 
questions, upon which no reasonable mind can doubt; such 
as, whether the teeth were made expressly for the mastica¬ 
tion of food, the feet for walking, the hands for holding; 
or whether, these things being as they are, being in fact 
in the animal’s possession, his own ingenuity taught him 
that they were convertible to these purposes, though no 
such purposes were contemplated in their formation. 
All that there is of the appearance of reason in this 
way of considering the subject is, that, in some cases, 
the organization seems to determine the habits of the ani¬ 
mal, and its choice, to a particular mode of life; which, 
in a certain sense, may be called “the use arising out of 
the part.” Now to all the instances, in which there is any 
place for this suggestion, it may be replied, that the organ¬ 
ization determines the animal to habits beneficial and salu¬ 
tary to itself; and that this effect would not be seen so 
regularly to follow, if the several organizations did not 
bear a concerted and contrived relation to the substance 
by which the animal was surrounded. They would, othcr- 
D* 
