178 
INSTINCTS. 
We assert, secondly, that, even as to the cases in whicn 
the hypothesis has the fairest claim to consideration, it 
does not at all lessen the force of the argument for inten¬ 
tion and design. The doctrine of instincts is that of ap¬ 
petencies, supcradded to the constitution of an animal, for 
the effectuating of a purpose beneficial to the species. The 
above-stated solution would derive these appetencies from 
organization; but then this organization is not less speci¬ 
fically, not less precisely, and, therefore, not less evidently 
adapted to the same ends, than the appetencies themselves 
would be upon the old hypothesis. In this way of consid¬ 
ering the subject, sensation supplies the place of foresight; 
but this is the effect of contrivance on the part of the 
Creator. Let it be allowed, for example, that the hen is 
induced to brood upon her eggs by the enjoyment or re¬ 
lief which, in the heated state of her abdomen, she ex¬ 
periences from the pressure of round smooth surfaces, or 
from the application of a temperate warmth. How comes 
this extraordinary heat or itching, or call it what you will, 
which you suppose to be the cause of the bird’s inclina¬ 
tion, to be felt, just at the time when the inclination itself 
is wanted; when it tallies so exactly with the internal 
constitution of the egg, and with the help which that con¬ 
stitution requires in order to bring it to maturity ? In my 
opinion, this solution, if it be accepted as to the fact, ought 
to increase, rather than otherwise, our admiration of the 
contrivance. A gardener lighting up his stoves, just when 
he wants to force his fruit, and when his trees require the 
heat, gives not a more certain evidence of design. So 
again; when a male and female sparrow come together, they 
do not meet to confer upon the expediency of perpetuating 
their species. As an abstract proposition, they care not 
the value of a barley-corn, whether the species be perpetu¬ 
ated or not: they follow their sensations; and all those 
consequences ensue, which the wisest counsels could have 
dictated, which the most solicitous care of futurity, which 
the most anxious concern for the sparrow world could have 
produced. But how do these consequences ensue? The 
sensations, and the constitution upon which they depend, 
are as manifestly directed to the purpose which we see 
fulfilled by them; and the train of intermediate effects, as 
manifestly laid and planned with a view to that purpose; 
that is to say, design is as completely evinced by the phe¬ 
nomena, as it would be, even if we suppose the operations 
to begin, or to be carried on, from what some will allow to 
be alone properly called instincts, that is, from desires di- 
