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THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY. 
“ If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure 
of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many sores 
and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification 
and enjoyment: or by placing us amidst objects so ill 
suited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended 
us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. 
He might have made, for example, everything we tasted, 
bitter; everything we saw, loathsome; everything we 
touched, a sting; every smell, a stench; and every sound, 
a discord. • 
‘‘ If he had been indifferent about our happiness or mis¬ 
ery, we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by 
this supposition is excluded) both the capacity of our sense# 
to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted 
to produce it. 
“But either of these, and still more both of them, be¬ 
ing too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains 
but the first supposition, that God, when he created the 
human species, wished their happiness; and made for them 
the provision which he has made, with that view and for 
that purpose. 
“ The same argument may be proposed in different terms; 
thus: Contrivance proves design: and the predominant 
tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the 
designer. The world abounds with contrivances: and all 
the contrivances which we are acquainted with, are direct¬ 
ed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but is 
never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. 
Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now 
and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps insepara¬ 
ble from it: or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in 
the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a 
distinction which well deserves to be attended to. In de¬ 
scribing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of 
the sickle, that it is made to cut the reaper’s hand; though, 
from the construction of the instrument, and the manner 
of using it, this mischief often follows. But if you had oc¬ 
casion to describe instruments of torture or execution: this 
engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dis¬ 
locate the joints; this to break the bones; this to scorch 
the soles of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very 
objects of the contrivance. Now, nothing of this sort is 
to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a 
train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No 
anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calcu¬ 
lated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the 
