THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY. 
265 
works, in her great purposes there never are. Her species 
never fail. The provision which was originally made for 
continuing the replenishment of the world, has proved itself 
to be effectual through a long succession of ages. 
What farther shows, that the system of" destruction 
amongst animals holds an express relation to the system of 
fecundity; that they are parts indeed of one compensatory 
scheme; is, that in each species the fecundity bears a 
proportion to the smallness of the animal, to the weakness, 
to the shortness of its natural term of life, and to the dan¬ 
gers and enemies by which it is surrounded. An elephant 
produces but one calf: a butterfly lays six hundred eggs. 
Birds of prey seldom produce more than two eggs: the 
sparrow tribe, and the duck tribe, frequently sit upon a 
dozen. In the rivers, we meet with a thousand minnows 
for one pike; in the sea, a million of herrings for a single 
shark. Compensation obtains throughout. Defenceless¬ 
ness and devastation are repaired by fecundity. 
We have dwelt the longer upon these considerations, be¬ 
cause the subject to which they apply, namely, that of ani¬ 
mals devouring one another, forms the chief, if not the only 
instance, in the works of the Deity, of an economy, stamp¬ 
ed by marks of design, in which the character of utility can 
be called in question. The case of venomous animals is of 
much inferior consequence to the case of prey, and in 
some degree, is also included under it. To both cases, it 
is probable that many more reasons belong, than those of 
which we are in possession 
Our first proposition, and that which we have hither¬ 
to been defending, was, “that, in a vast plurality of in¬ 
stances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the 
contrivance is beneficial.” 
Our second proposition is, “that the Deity has ad¬ 
ded pleasure to animal sensations, beyond what was neces¬ 
sary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as 
it was necessary, might have been effected by the opera¬ 
tion of pain.” 
This proposition may be thus explained: The capaci¬ 
ties which, according to the established course of nature, are 
necessary to the support or preservation of an animal, how¬ 
ever manifestly they may be the result of an organization 
contrived for the purpose, can only be deemed an act or 
a part of the same will, as that which decreed the exis¬ 
tence of the animal itself; because, whether the creation 
proceeded from a benevolent or a malevolent being, these 
Y 
