268 
THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY. 
stituted, as to be able, either universally, or within certain 
limits, by habit and familiarity, to render every object 
pleasant. Whichever of these suppositions we adopt, the 
effect evinces, on the part of the Author of Nature, a stu¬ 
dious benevolence. If the pleasures which we derive from 
any of our senses depend upon an original congruity be¬ 
tween the sense and the properties perceived by it, we 
know by experience, that the adjustment demanded, with 
respect to the qualities which were conferred upon the 
objects that surround us, not only choice and selection, 
out of a boundless variety of possible qualities, with which 
these objects might have been endued, but a proporlioning 
also of degree , because an excess or defect of intensity 
spoils the perception, as much almost as an error in the 
kind and nature of the quality. Likewise the degree of 
dulness or acuteness in the sense itself, is no arbitrary 
thing, but in order to preserve the congruity here spoken 
of, requires to be in an exact or near correspondency 
with the strength of the impression. The duiness of the 
senses forms the complaint of old age. Persons in fe¬ 
vers, and, I believe, in most maniacal cases, experience 
great torment from their preternatural acuteness. An in¬ 
creased, no less than an impaired sensibility, induces a 
state of disease and suffering. 
The doctrine of a specific congruity between animal 
senses and their objects, is strongly favored by what is ob¬ 
served of insects in the selection of their food. Some of 
these will feed upon one kind of plant or animal, and upon 
no other: some caterpillars upon the cabbage alone; some 
upon the black currant alone. The species of caterpillar 
which eats the vine, will starve upon the elder; nor will 
that which we find upon fennel, touch the rosebush. Some 
insects confine themselves to two or three kinds of plants 
or animals. Some again show so strong a preference, as 
to afford reason to believe, that, though they may be driv¬ 
en by hunger to others, they are led by the pleasure of 
taste to a few particular plants alone: and all this, as it 
should seem, independently of habit or imitation. 
But should we accept the third hypothesis, and even car¬ 
ry it so far, as to ascribe everything which concerns the 
question to habit, (as in certain species, the human spe¬ 
cies most particularly, there is reason to attribute some¬ 
thing,) we have then before us an animal capacity, not less 
perhaps to be admired than the native congruities which 
the other scheme adopts. It cannot be shown to result 
