THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY. 
£71 
ly, that it agrees with our observation to suppose, that 
some degree of these inconveniences takes place in the 
works of nature. These points may be allowed; and it 
may also be asserted, that the general laws with which we 
are acquainted, are directed to beneficial ends. On the 
other hand, with many of these laws we are not acquaint¬ 
ed at all, or we are totally unable to trace them in their 
branches, and in their operation; the effect of which igno¬ 
rance is, that they cannot be of importance to us as meas¬ 
ures by which to regulate our conduct. The conservation 
of them may be of importance in other respects, or to other 
beings, but we are uninformed of their value or use; unin¬ 
formed, consequently, when, and how far, they may or may 
not be suspended, or their effects turned aside, by a presi¬ 
ding and benevolent will, without incurring greater evils 
than those which would be avoided. The consideration, 
therefore, of general laws, although it may concern the 
question of the origin of evil very nearly, (which I think it 
does.) rests in views disproportionate to our faculties, and 
in a knowledge which we do not possess. It seryes rather 
to account for the obscurity of the subject, than to supply 
us with distinct answers to our difficulties. However, 
whilst we assent to the above stated propositions as princi¬ 
ples, whatever uncertainty we may find in the application, 
we lay a ground for believing, that cases of apparent evil, 
for which we can suggest no particular reason, are govern¬ 
ed by reasons, which are more general, which lie deeper 
in the order of second causes, and which on that account 
are removed to a greater distance from us. 
The doctrine of imperfections , or, as it is called, of evils 
of imperfection, furnishes an account, founded, like the 
former, in views of universal nature. The doctrine is 
briefly this:—It is probable, that creation may be better 
replenished by sensitive beings of different sorts, than by 
sensitive beings all of one sort. It is likewise probable, 
that it may be better replenished by different orders of be¬ 
ings rising one above another in gradation, than by beings 
possessed of equal degrees of perfection. Now, a grada¬ 
tion of such beings, implies a gradation of imperfections. 
No class can justly complain of the imperfections which 
belong to its place in the scale, unless it were allowable 
for it to complain, that a scale of being was appointed in 
nature; for which appointment there appear to be reasons 
of wisdom and goodness. 
In like manner, finiteness, or what is resolvable into 
