282 
THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY. 
a judge, the resolution of an assembly, the issue of a con¬ 
tested election, will have more or less of the appearance 
of chance, might be more or less the subject of a wager, 
according as we were less or more acquainted with the 
reasons which influenced the deliberation. The differ¬ 
ence resides in the information of the observer, and not 
in the thing itself; which, in all the cases proposed, 
proceeds from intelligence, from mind, from counsel, from 
design. 
Now when this one cause of the appearance of chance, 
viz. the ignorance of the observer, comes to be applied to 
the operations of the Deity, it is easy to foresee how fruit¬ 
ful it must prove of difficulties, and of seeming confusion. 
It is only to think of the Deity, to perceive, what variety 
of objects, what distance of time, what extent of space 
and action, his counsels may, or rather must, comprehend. 
Can it be wondered at, that, of the purposes which dwell in 
such a mind as this, so small a part should be kMown to 
us? It is only necessary, therefore, to bear in our thought, 
that in proportion to the inadequateness of our information, 
will be the quantity, in the world, of apparent chance. 
III. In a great variety of cases, and of cases compre¬ 
hending numerous subdivisions, it appears, for many rea¬ 
sons, to be better that events rise up by chance, or, more 
properly speaking, with the appearance of chance, than ac¬ 
cording to any observable rule whatever. This is not sel¬ 
dom the case even in human arrangements. Each person’s 
place and precendency in a public meeting, may be deter¬ 
mined by lot. Work and labor may be allotted. Tasks 
and burdens may be allotted :— 
-Operumque laborem 
Partibus sequabat justis, aut sorte trahebat. 
Military service and station may be allotted. The dis¬ 
tribution of provision may be made by lot, as it is in a sail¬ 
or’s mess; in some cases also, the distribution of favors 
may be made by lot. In all these cases, it seems to be ac¬ 
knowledged, that there are advantages in permitting events 
to chance, superior to those which would or could arise 
from regulation. In all these cases, also, though events 
rise up in the way of chance, it is by appointment that they 
do so. 
In other events, and such as are independent of human 
will, the reasons for this preference of uncertainty to rule, 
appear to be still stronger. For example, it seems to be 
expedient that the period of human life should be uncertain 
