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THE GOODNESS OF THE DEITY. 
portion of faculties and opportunities, as any unknown 
cause, or concourse of causes, or as causes acting for other 
purposes, may happen to set them out: but the event is gov¬ 
erned by that which depends upon themselves, the applica¬ 
tion of what they have received. In dividing the talents, 
no rule was observed; none was necessary: In rewarding 
the use of them, that of the most correct justice. The chief 
difference at last appears to be, that the right use of more 
talents, i. e. of a greater trust, will be more highly reward¬ 
ed, than the right use of fewer talents, i. e. of a less trust. 
And since, for other purposes, it is expedient that there be 
an inequality of concredited talents here, as well, probably, 
as an inequality of conditions hereafter, though all remuner- 
atory; can any rule, adapted to that inequality, be more 
agreeable, even to our apprehensions of distributive justice 
than this is? 
We have said that the appearance of casualty, which 
attends the occurrences and events of life, not only does 
not interfere with its uses, as a state of probation, but that 
it promotes these uses. 
Passive virtues, of all others the severest and the most 
sublime; of all others, perhaps, the most acceptable to the 
Deity; would, it is evident, be excluded from a constitution, 
in which happiness and misery regularly followed virtue and 
vice. Patience and composure under distress, affliction, 
and pain; a steadfast keeping up of our confidence in God, 
and of our reliance upon his final goodness, at the time 
when everything present is adverse and discouraging; and 
(what is no less difficult to retain) a cordial desire for the 
happiness of others, even when we are deprived of our own: 
these dispositions, which constitute, perhaps, the perfec¬ 
tion of our moral nature, would not have found their pro¬ 
per office and object in a state of avowed retribution; and 
in which, consequently, endurance of evil would be only 
submission to punishment. 
Again: One man’s sufferings may be another man’s 
trial. The family of a sick parent is a school of filial 
piety. The charities of domestic life, and not only these, 
but all the social virtues, are called out by distress. But 
then, misery, to be the proper object of mitigation, or of 
that benevolence which endeavours to relieve, must be real¬ 
ly or apparently casual. It is upon such sufferings alone 
that benevolence can operate. For were there no evils in 
the world, but what were punishments, properly and intelr 
ligibly such, benevolence would only stand in the way of 
