Scientific Arrangement of the Sensibilities. 
39 ’ 
its citizenship save as it becomes character—is placed under disci¬ 
pline of alternatives, in adjustment to environment, only by means 
of the appeal of sensibilities; and consequently feeling, in its various 
forms, becomes a second subsidiary function in the mental life. This 
order in the treatment of mind—which, to do it justice, should be 
much more fully given in detail—has the justification that it deals 
with m'nd as we deal with every structure, whether vital or mechanicaL 
Of course this is said only on the supposition that mind in itself has 
a final cause—that man as a free being is accountable under moral order. 
If we are intelligently considering, in order to understand, a locomotive 
engine, we go straight to the heart of this world's wonder in the force 
which moves the mighty pistonrod. From out that heart, we follow 
back to the steam and the fire which generates it, and the furnace and 
the boiler as needful conditions, and forward to the valves and the 
cylinder chamber, the levers and the wheels, by which it is applied to the 
problem of movement. If we would enlighten the pupil concerning 
a tree, we direct him first of all to the appropriative and digestive 
force which constitutes the active principle of life, furnishing from 
soil and by sunlight the varied material and varied fiber. The leaf, 
the root, the trunk, the branches, the new seed, follow in their order. 
With the human body it is the same. I cannot see why it should not 
be so in the study of mind—that we should not adopt for our order 
will, intellect, sensibilities. 
4. Of the remaining questions which 1 wish to leave an impression 
of. one is concerning the possibility of a more scientific arrangement 
of the sensibilities. Even upon the supposition that all the feelings 
are but ulterior and elaborated sensations arising in evolutionary 
order and issuing in so-called naturally determined action, should 
there not be an organic conception of them? Nature is orderly, and 
is quite capable of giving an account of herself in the terms of order 
anywhere. She has no real conglomerates. Especially it is impossible to 
justify fairly the absence of due logical subordination, to which this 
most interesting function has been abandoned by those who recognize 
the moral personality of mind. The traditional classification—simple 
emotions, affections and desires—has no justification in any organic 
conception of mental life. 
Would it not be worth while to try as a working hypothesis at 
least, in case mind is free personality under moral law, whether we may 
not find among the sensibilities some that constitute the appeal of that 
realm of law to this freely acting personality? It may be—it seems 
reasonable that it should be—nay, it seems manifest that it is true, that, 
correlative to the law of the true, under which mind acts in judgment, 
and the law of beauty, under which the sensibilities are ordered in 
feeling, and to the dual law of the good, under which the will is responsi¬ 
ble in citizenship, there are clearly defined and explained sensibilities 
which stand as advocates before the free personality to induce the 
