Epistemology Empirically Considered. 41 
5. Socrates in the Republic is made to say: (C e7ti6vry,irj is the knowl¬ 
edge, in respecb to the reality, that the reality is.” Now it is affirmed that 
“we have numerous sensations and by means of these we acquire ideas. 
We then assume external objects as the cause of these sensations and ideas. 
Empirical psychology therefore relegates the further handling of the 
problem, in so far as it is capable of any solution whatever, to Episte¬ 
mology.” Now I would raise the question whether Epistemology is res¬ 
ponsible for giving account of the causes of sensations and ideas any 
more than it is for certifying the reality of subjective sensations and 
ideas themselves. Is it any less gratuitous to say that we have sensa¬ 
tions and ideas or to entertain a concept of sensations and ideas as being 
their mental image representing a mental reality, than it is to affirm a 
cause of our psychic states? If it is not legitimate for empirical psy¬ 
chology to affirm causes of mental states then it is not legitimate for 
empirical psychology to affirm ideas or sensations. An idea is some¬ 
thing, a sensation is something, even though it be merely a phenomenon. 
The question is, whether in case we have not Epistemology, there can be 
not only any affirmation of causes, but any trust in the existence of sen¬ 
sations or ideas. Does not a psychology which leaves a lacuna oppofite- 
the word knowledge , for the same reason leave one opposite the word 
■ reality , opposite the word sensation , opposite the word therefore , op¬ 
posite the word science? This only goes so far as to constitute a caveat 
against making any part of psychology its own verification. Empiri¬ 
cal psychology, whether it be constructed by consciousness alone or 
with the valuable aid of physiology, is a dependent science. It is a 
natural science—I am quite willing it should be called so, if the human 
mind be regarded as a part of the fundementally free system of nature 
and not a part of a supernatural realm, as Dr. Bushnell classes it, and 
all its phenomena are answerable to the law of sufficient reason and so 
are verified by Epistemology. 
I was intending, however, only to ask the question as to the order of 
studying the cognitive function of mind. If it is by the exercise of this 
function that knowledge is had, and the science of knowledge, which is 
Epistemology, exists, the function itself is a topic of psychology. It has 
always been a puzzle how to furnish any adequate warrant for the ver¬ 
acity of the senses. Any explanation which can be furnished out of the 
phenomena of mere sensation by recurring to the coordination and 
mutual consensus of all the senses is unsatisfying. It is in vain to re¬ 
sort to the Cartesian verification in the veraciousness of a beneficent 
Creator, for this would involve sooner or later a circle in reasoning. 
Must we not first find our verifications in the certainties of reason? Does 
not the significance of the five senses lie in the fact that we have super¬ 
sense cognition, or reason? It is customary to begin the study of the 
presentative functions of mind with the subject of sensation and sense- 
perception, doing as well as we can with the question why we should 
5-A. & L. 
