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Wisconsin Academy of Sciences , Arts and Letters. 
bath. But neither chance nor spontaneous action will account for the in¬ 
variable series in nature’s work which I have illustrated in the expansion of 
cooling water with its effects; therefore, final cause must be assumed. I 
am not considering the value of this argument; I only note it as the first. 
Secondly, each thing in nature acts as it is adapted by nature to act; and 
as it acts, so it is adapted by nature. It acts for some end, therefore it was 
naturally produced for that end. If a house were among natural things it 
would be constituted as it now is by art. And if natural things could be 
produced by art, it would constitute them and adapt them as they now 
are. Art sometimes imitates nature; sometimes attempts what nature 
does not; but in both cases for some end. The argument, then from art’s 
having an end to final cause in nature is valid; for the relation of prior to 
posterior is the same in both. 
Thirdly, we have no warrant for imputing conscious art or deliberation, 
to insects or to vegetables; yet there is an end, a form towards which these 
work. 
Here we note an objection, that if nature seeks an end, she does not al¬ 
ways reach it. But the same thing is true of art, wherein all admit the 
existence of final cause. This principle does not exclude the principle of 
necessary conditions, which are found in the matter by which all things 
that are produced are conditioned. In these we must find the cause of 
failure. The end of a saw is to cut wood, but iron is the necessary matter, 
and may be the cause of failure. So nature requires the matter, but the 
end is found in the form, the idea (eidos). If the end is to be reached, the 
antecedent conditions must also exist; if these latter do not exist, then the 
former cannot exist. 
Without criticizing these arguments, I note the wide divergence of 
method from the empirical. But as the latter can only discover antecedent 
conditions existing in time, we need not allow it to interfere with our esti¬ 
mate of Aristotle's analysis of final cause and his attempted demonstration. 
Its value seems to consist largely in its fixing attention on the necessity 
of a rational explanation of nature. For who explains a watch by merely 
stating its materials, and the physical antecedents of its motions? The 
plan, the adaptation of part to part, the end accomplished, are still more es¬ 
sential. So in nature. Who explains a woodpecker’s tongue, if he de¬ 
scribes its anatomy and mechanism, and speculates concerning its origin, 
but leaves out its relations to the bird and the conditions of its life ? 
III. 6. The infinite is a physical concept which requires examination 
and definition. Physics treat of body, that which has dimensions; and 
whether it be known sensibly, or regarded in thought, it is necessarily lim¬ 
ited, finite. Potentially it exists in thought as indefinite, (apeiron) that 
from which something can always be taken away, which can be always 
further divided, to which something of the same kind can always be added. 
Distinguish, therefore, the perfect, the completed whole, (teleion) which as 
such, admits of no addition or subtraction. 
