100 Gregory—Negro Suffrage in Wisconsin. 
all subjects and for all offices, cast at such election, in favor of 
the extension of suffrage, before it can be adopted, is the true 
construction, then the same voter might cast one vote in favor 
of the extension, and in voting for the candidates for the dif¬ 
ferent offices cast ten votes which would be counted against the 
very measure he voted for. The absurdity involved in the first 
construction is conclusive against it. To adopt the second con¬ 
struction would be to say that the word ‘votes,’ in the clause 
in question, meant the same as the word ‘voters.’ ... If, 
however, we should concede that the clause in question could be 
construed to mean, or was equivalent to, ‘approved by a ma¬ 
jority of all the voters voting at such election,’ it would not 
follow that it had reference to a majority of voters voting on 
any other measure than the one mentioned in the proviso; or 
that the number of votes cast at such election for the candidates 
for any office should determine whether the suffrage was extended 
or not. . . . Under the provisions of our constitution, as 
well as of other constitutions, persons are elected to a particular 
office who have a majority of the votes cast—not for the candi¬ 
dates for some other office, but for the candidates for that office. 
To declare a measure or law adopted or defeated — not 
by the number of votes cast directly for or against it, but by 
the number cast for and against some other measure, or for the 
candidates for some office or offices, not connected with the 
measure itself, would not only be out of the ordinary course of 
legislation, but, so far as we know, a thing unknown in con¬ 
stitutional law.According to section 1, 
article 12 of the constitution, the Legislature may propose 
amendments to it, and if they are approved ‘by a majority of the 
voters voting thereon ’ at the time prescribed by the Legislature, 
the amendments become a part of the constitution. The right 
of suffrage by such amendment could be given to colored per¬ 
sons. Is it probable that the framers of our constitution required 
more votes to extend the right of suffrage in one way than in 
another? . . . We see no reason for such a conclusion." 
Chief Justice Dixon, agreeing with Justice Downer, wrote: 
"I do not see how the language could ever have been the sub¬ 
ject of doubt or controversy. To me, to whom the question was 
