Expression of Thought. 
9 
when, instead of standing for more than one idea, it stands 
for an idea and also for that idea’s function or association. 1 
REINSTATIYE SYMBOLIZATION. 
In developing my theory it is further convenient to make use 
of what may be called the doctrine of reinstcitive symbolization. 
Of this let the sentence “I met Brown to-day ” serve as intro¬ 
duction. In this sentence the word “ Brown ” excites in the 
hearer’s mind an idea of which, it will be assumed, he would not 
otherwise be conscious. The symbolizing act may in this case 
be called introductory or initial. 
The idea excited by the word “ Brown ” must plainly remain 
in consciousness till all the elements of thought to be expressed 
1 When a word expresses more than one idea, the naming of one 
of the ideas may or may not be effected by the termination (prefix, in¬ 
fix or other variation). When, in addition to an idea, its association or 
function is to be indicated, the aid of a termination is usually invoked. 
In the highly inflected languages almost every word is in some of these ways 
a multiple symbol. 
Historically the instructional elements (functional and associational) are 
always original idea-namers. It is accordingly not surprising that a 
given termination should exhibit on different occasions the different pow¬ 
ers which it has successively acquired. Thus the Latin “ cognovit” on one 
occasion contains in itself its subject (he); on another the personal ending 
merely shows association with a subject expressed by another word; at the 
same time this ending, being used with no other kind of thought-element, 
has functional value, being evidence that the idea expressed is the mid¬ 
term (principal verb). 
The same word-ending may then express a thought-element, its associa¬ 
tion or its function— sometimes one and sometimes another — sometimes 
one only, sometimes two, sometimes all three. The distinction made is 
therefore useless for the purpose of ending-classification. As well endeavor 
to classify the cattle in the field by their momentary place or doings. 
But, apart from the possible interest to the zoologist, the where-abouts 
and the what-abouts of each animal may have an immediate interest to 
its owner. He can hardly afford to ignore differences between here and 
there or between doing this and doing that. So too with these termina¬ 
tions; though I cannot classify them by the differences in their values, 
I must not forget that these values are different. I must also recognize 
the particular value of each on each particular occasion. Fortunately 
such recognition is rarely difficult. 
