Expression of Thought. 
3 
by no proper knowledge of more than a single language. In 
fact a new linguistic effort has begun. Warned by the failures 
of grammar, it strives to be intelligible. Taught by the over¬ 
sight of philology, it aims at greater completeness. 
PART I. DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY. 
The following discussion is largely put in the first and second 
person, for the sake of a little gain in objectivity. It takes up 
in turn the judgment, the nature of its elements and their bear¬ 
ing one upon another. It shows how language on the one hand 
names these parts and on the other indicates their mutual bear¬ 
ing. Alongside of this naming and this indicating it admits 
the occurrence of irrelevant elements. Having thus mapped out 
the lingustic field, it seeks to find in it the proper place for the 
connective. 
I. EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT. 
LANGUAGE SYMBOLIZES JUDGMENTS. 
I begin with the judgment, because the aim of language is 
obviously to express a mental total of no less completeness. I 
may indeed, by uttering a single word, arouse in your mind 
the idea which it names. Also you may infer, unless I falsify, 
that the idea is in my own mind. I may for instance rouse you to 
think of a chimney and to the opinion that I am thinking of 
the same. But this involves some effort on your part as well 
as my own; and plainly the game is not worth the candle. 
Nor is it enough for you to know that two or more ideas are 
together in my mind. Every such combination is in a way a 
mental experiment, a sort of mental tasting of a mental mix¬ 
ture. To carry out the suggested comparison, suppose you 
taste in my presence an unfamiliar fruit. It is of no great in¬ 
terest to me to know that you have it in your mouth. What 
might be useful to me is to know whether you like it; and this I 
might learn from the expression of your face. So too, 
when you taste a mental combination, my gain for the most 
part lies in knowing how the combination affects you. In my 
