Legal Aspect of Fees. 
205 
As for the rest, the courts have held in some cases 1 that 
charge should be sufficient to cover only a small part of the ex¬ 
penses incurred by the state; while in others 2 they have 
sanctioned fees high enough to cover not only the cost of direct 
regulation, but enough to produce a fund to protect the com¬ 
munity from indirect and probable injurious consequences of the 
exercise of the privilege. In still other decisions the stand is 
taken that the fees should be high enough to indemnify the 
state for the exact cost of furnishing the service to the individ¬ 
ual ; but this cost is interpreted to include only the direct con¬ 
sequences. 
This is the nature of the decisions of the United States Cir¬ 
cuit Court for the Western District of Pa. in the case of West¬ 
ern Union Telegraph Co. vs. Philadelphia . 3 The court held that 
an ordinance of the city of Philadelphia, charging $16,000 for 
a license to the telegraph company, levied a tax, and not a fee, 
because it far exceeded the amount expended by the city in pro¬ 
tecting persons and property from injury from the poles, wires,, 
and other property of the telegraph company. Two years later 
a similar case 4 came up for adjudication in the courts of Mis¬ 
souri, aud was taken to the United States Supreme Court. The 
question at issue was whether the city of St. Louis could charge 
five dollars per pole for its permission to the Western Union 
Telegraph Co. to do business in the city. The Supreme Court 
1 Trans. Co. vs. Parksburg , 107 U. S., 691; Packet Co. vs. Keokuk y 
95 U. S., 80; Packet Co. vs. St. Louis , 100 U. S., 423. 
2 Cincinnati vs. Buckingham , 12 Ohio, 257. 
State vs. Cassidy, 22 Minn., 320. “ It, (the state) regards the traffic- 
(in liquor) as tending to produce intemperance, and as likely to entail upon 
the state the expense and burden of providing for a class of persons ren¬ 
dered incapable of self-support. The evil influence and example upon 
society is necessarily injurious to the public welfare and prosperity, and 
therefore calls for such legislative action as will operate as a restraint upon 
the business flowing from its prosecution. To this end a license is re¬ 
quired, and the business restricted to such persons as are willing to 
indemnify the state in part against such probable results. . . . These 
measures are undoubtedly police measures — it is not at all important, 
whether the license produce revenue to the city or not.” 
3 107 U. S., 365. 
4 St. Louis vs. W. U. Tel. Co. 
