Motive Defined. 
391 
tive is this: All is motive in view of which, or under the 
influence of which, the will acts. The most important discrim¬ 
ination implied in this definition is, that motives are of two kinds, 
that is, generically two: the one kind is made up of those persuas¬ 
ives which are addressed to the mind through intelligence, the 
other those that are addressed to the mind through feeling in any 
form. The will acts “in view of, ” which implies intelligence, and it 
acts “ under the influence of, ” which implies feeling. These classes 
of motive are inconvertible the one into the other, and, since 
they are unlike in kind, they are incomparable and incommen¬ 
surable as to strength. We cannot estimate the relative amount 
of sweetness in a lump of sugar as compared with the sweetness 
of the Scotch song “Annie Laurie,” nor either with the sweet¬ 
ness of a rose. Just at this point error has marred many ex¬ 
positions of the nature of the will. It is assumed that all 
motive is in feeling in this form or in that, and that a reason 
becomes a motive only as it awakens a desire. “ There can no 
more be motive except in the form of good or happiness to the 
agent,” says Dr. N. W. Taylor, “than there can be motive 
which is not motive.” A logical corollary of the statement is, 
that the will is as the strongest motive; and a second corollary 
is, that the will is not free; for it must act, according to the 
theory, in the line of the strongest desire. Indeed, if there be 
no motive except in feeling, notwithstanding our prejudices in 
favor of liberty, the doctrine of freedom as applied to the will 
must be abandoned. 
Motives, then, are of two kinds; they are either intellectual 
or emotional, rational or in feeling. Of the former class we 
may note that they persuade the will in three special ways. 
First of all, the intelligence apprehends the intrinsic value that 
resides in the end per se , the ultimate good, and persuades the 
mind or will to choose this good on its own account. This 
value which resides in the ultimate end, and which the intelli¬ 
gence apprehends as valuable on its own account, has been 
called by some the subjective motive—subjective, not because 
it is in the mind, but because it is in the end itself. It is the 
inward reason in view of which the will acts; and the imme¬ 
diate moral state of the soul is determined by the question 
