892 Merrell—Relation of Motives to Freedom. 
whether this subjective motive is accepted or rejected in the* 
will’s ultimate act. The mind is free to choose or to reject this 
ultimate value which the intelligence presents; and as the last 
element of freedom is just here, so also here must be found the 
ultimate element of virtue or sin. Second, the mind estimates 
the value of a proximate end and its relation to one ulterior as 
promotive of it, and persuades to its accomplishment or dis¬ 
suades from its pursuit according as this end is or is not judged 
to be promotive of the ulterior end which has been previously- 
accepted. The value in a proximate end is known to be rela¬ 
tive, and not intrinsic; and, since it is not sought for its own 
sake, the immediate motive of its pursuit does not determine- 
the question of moral state. Rational motives in this form con¬ 
sist simply in intellectual estimates of values and tendencies. 
In a third general way, motives are presented to the mind by 
the intelligence when it apprehends the relation of some proxi¬ 
mate end to the gratification of desire. It is impossible in this 
brief statement to tarry with explanations of the latter two of 
these classes of motives; all we need to say of them is that they 
have no immediate relation to liberty of choice. They are in 
all minds, influence all minds, but they do not determine the- 
moral state. 
The second great class of motives consists of those of every 
sort which are furnished to the mind by desire or impulse. The 
desire is the real motive, rather than that on which the desire 
fastens. These act directly on the will without the interven¬ 
tion of intelligence, and in general persuade the will to become 
subordinated to themselves. They act as a vis a ter go; and if 
no intelligence intervenes, or, as in the case of the brutes, if 
there be no rationality to intervene, the mind becomes practi¬ 
cally an automaton, going uniformly in the way of the strongest 
momentary desire. Even if the desire be in the line of objective 
or outward right, the will is not virtuous while in subjection to 
such desire; and this for the reason that desire in any form 
does not control the will in freedom, that is, does not determine 
its action in reference to the ultimate end. 
In their relation to liberty motives may be contemplated as 
either objective or subjective, though the use of those terms in 
