Owen—Hybrid Parts of Speech. 
121 
Of cases (3) and (4), which are merely a single case ex¬ 
amined from opposite points of view, one aspect only needs to 
be considered. Let the preference he given to the more con¬ 
venient (3) ; and let the purposes of illustration he effected hy 
the following pair of judgments reading downward: 
(a) (&) 
A wounding 
wounded caused 
B death 
As thus exhibited, these judgments have no simultaneous 
factor. That is, no term of either is, without a second think¬ 
ing, term of the other. Accordingly, no element of either be¬ 
ing also an element of the other, no word for any element has 
an opportunity to serve as simultaneously two parts of speech— 
that is, no word in either sentence can he a hybrid. 
Let the effort now he made to use the idea serving in (a) 
as mid-term (expressed hy “wounded”), as first (or last) term 
of (&), and that without a second thinking. This effort may 
he indicated hy the diagram: 
A 
wounded caused death 
B 
If now in linguistic practice the operation of “wounded” (or 
any substitute) he that suggested hy the diagram, it shall he 
granted that a verbal hybrid is occasioned hy two thoughts of 
which each one is a judgment. But in linguistic practice 
nothing of the sort, so far as I have found to date, occurs. Ac¬ 
cordingly, without delaying to search for causes, which pre¬ 
sumably would he found in practical considerations, I offer, in 
mere delimitation of the field to he examined, this conclusion: 
that two judgments do not occasion verbal hybrids—or, in 
other words, in order that a verbal hybrid operate in the ex¬ 
pression of two interlocking thoughts, one thought must not as¬ 
sume the rank of a judgment—must he a conception. But it 
was previously concluded that one of them must he a judgment. 
Combining these two conclusions, and using, as before, the word 
conception to name the thought which is not a judgment, I 
