126 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters. 
if deprived of either factor), the ultimately constituted thought 
would seem, of necessity, to include some half a dozen terms. 
But (as indicated in that discussion, and further argued on 
page 135), in order to be incorporated, the preceding thought 
gave up its detailed existence, appearing in the following 
thought unanalyzed, quite in the fashion of an idea—that is, an 
ordinary single member of thought. In other words, to become 
a member of the following thought, the preceding thought gave 
up its distinctive existence as a thought. I therefore do not 
contradict myself in saying now that, strictly speaking, a cen¬ 
tral thought as such (qua central), consists of three terms 18 
only. 
In defending this statement, I note imprimis that the aug¬ 
mentation of a three-term central thought by any further ele¬ 
ment entails the consciousness of a relation between the new 
element and one (or more) of the old; 19 that is, such augmen¬ 
tation entails the formation of another thought consisting of an 
old element, a new element and the relation between them. 20 
That this other thought and the central thought together form 
a larger thought, I not only concede but also contend (as indi¬ 
cated on pages 116 and 125 and again on page 139). Accord¬ 
ingly, to establish my opinion that a central thought consists 
of three terms only, I must show that the second constituent of 
this larger thought is not central. 
Of the second constituent thought, it would seem to be a 
safe assumption that it must be (1) central like the first or 
(2’) lateral or (3) partly one and partly the other or (4) both 
at once or (5) both in succession or (6) neither. | 
is That one of these terms may be a group of ideas—homogenous, as 
in “three fruits,” or heterogeneous, as in “an apple, a peach, and a 
pear”—I concede as plausible, but avoid the case as special to the 
investigation of that class of so-called conjunctions which may be 
known as group-formers. 
is For otherwise the new element would have nothing to do with 
the original thought, and, accordingly, could not be a part of it. 
20 Thus, the expansion of “Apples are wholesome” into “Ripe apples 
are wholesome” requires a recognition of apples in a qualitative re¬ 
lation with ripeness, essentially as in “Apples (which) are ripe.” The 
fact that, in the thought thus indicated, the common idea expressed by 
“apples” appears in mind but once, does not impair the integrity of 
either thought, any more than a common corner-stone impairs the in¬ 
tegrity of either south or east wall of my house. 
