Owen-Hybrid Parts of Speech. 181 
aid to interpretation, it cannot be regarded as what is actually 
expressed by speech. 
Second, the linguistic. This is of necessity analytic, often 
extremely so. What I think at first as single (though complex) 
is presented, in the actual absence of an adequate single word 
for it, by a number of words expressing normally an equal num¬ 
ber of ideas. Thus, wishing, at a reception, to speak to you 
of a particular person—whose name is unavailable, because we 
do not both of us know it—I cannot suggest him to your mind, 
except by more or less of his permanent or momentary connota¬ 
tion, analyzed and expressed in detail. Obviously thought of 
this sort, and not its very different non-linguistic predecessor, 
must be accepted as what is directly intended by the sentence. 
Third, the perspective. This includes, in a collective recog¬ 
nition, each installment of thought delivered—or, say, the total 
thought expressed by the individual sentence. Of such a total 
when it is extensive, such a recognition—being in the nature 
of a bird’s eye view—inevitably loses many details. The in¬ 
dividual fellow-members of the single sub-thought blend into 
a sub-whole, which with other sub-wholes coalesces into a 
minor whole, such minor wholes combining into wholes of ma¬ 
jor rank. Also, by the aid of this blending process, the gist 
of one sentence is reinstated—or, it may be, even continued—• 
in another sentence; the substance of a. paragraph is incorpo¬ 
rated in its successor; indeed, w T hen reasoning and exposition 
are well conducted, the essential elements of a chapter, or even 
a volume, have the oneness of a vista reaching far into the dis¬ 
tance. See “Thought-Connectives,” page 48. 
This recognition of thought-masses is, however, an operation 
altogether different from their construction. To illustrate, when 
the Creator had completed the world, He recognized “quod esset 
bonum”. He may, moreover, have recognized, in the midst of 
creative activity, the goodness of what already was completed. 
But either act of recognition was obviously distinct and inde¬ 
pendent of the creative act. So also a mere forethinking of 
the creative act, and the appreciation that it would be good, 
should rank as mutually independent. The like impresses 
me as true of such a thinking, and the recognition that creation 
