234 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters. 
posed to be part. In “come not” of (2) the idea of untruth 
is specially expressed by “not” alone. It accordingly appears 
that the subjunctive can express the idea of truth, but cannot 
express the idea of untruth (except in certain languages in 
which, if I rightly understand, the function of “not” is per¬ 
formed by a verbal inflection). On the other hand, the sub¬ 
junctive cooperates in expressing either what is posed as true 
or what is posed as untrue. 
Accordingly I repudiate the notion that either truth or un¬ 
truth influences the use of indicative or subjunctive mode, hold¬ 
ing that the presence or absence of belief is what determines 
their respective use; and by parallel' reasoning I should reach 
the same conclusion for the other verbal forms. 
Even belief itself does not entail assertion, except under 
special conditions. All my life I have been aware that I have 
two hands—whenever I think of them. But I do not tell you 
of this possessing, unless at the moment of speaking I am 
thinking of it. So, too, in “Astronomers declare the sun to 
exceed the moon,” although I am frequently conscious that I 
believe in such exceeding, nevertheless I did not express that 
belief, because I was not thinking of it as I wrote the sentence. 
Hence I did not use an assertive form of the verb, but the un¬ 
assertive “to exceed.” 
Hor is this all. Although I express a thought, which at the 
moment of expression I am conscious of believing, I am by no 
means always bound to express my belief. Given only the 
thought expressible by “it to be raining,” I am plainly bound 
by linguistic courtesy to express belief, by saying “It is rain¬ 
ing,” or hold my peace. But in the statement “On account of 
its raining I must go,” belief in the raining, though still in 
mind, does not appear in my expression. 83 I have not re- 
ss As some linguistic students do not seem to be entirely clear in 
tbeir perception of the presence or absence of belief, I add the fol¬ 
lowing illustration: (1) “On account of its raining (conceived as the 
merest possibility and altogether unattended by belief) I should never 
give up a walk.” In this, the raining, posed as a mere contingency, 
is plainly attended by no belief. If now, in (2) “On account of its 
raining (conceived as true, or actually occurring) I must go,” the 
element “raining”—which in form precisely duplicates the “raining” 
