Owen—Hybrid Parts of Speech. 
235 
nounced belief itself, but only its membership of tkought-to 
be-expressed. On the other hand, in “It is raining; I must 
go,” I have renounced neither belief in raining nor its member¬ 
ship of thought expressed. 
It appears accordingly that, apart from the contra-linguistic 
practice of those who do not know the meanings of the words 
they use, and the strictly extra-linguistic practice of liars, pres¬ 
ence of belief, in thought intended—or its absence—determines 
the use of assertive or unassertive verbal forms. 
Any rule, accordingly, for the use of either instead of the 
other, would merely be a part of the rule already intimated: 
Always use in speech the word for what you intend, to the ex¬ 
clusion of the word for more or less than you intend—or, more 
briefly—“Say what you think.” 
It is so obvious that “voice” is normally determined by the 
proverse or reverse relation intended by the speaker (See page 
205), and that tense is controlled by the time intended by 
the speaker, that examination of tense and voice is quite un¬ 
necessary to the present topic. 
INFLUENCE OF THOUGHT-STRUCTURE. 
By the structure of thought I mean its architecture, as dis¬ 
tinguished from the elements of which it is built—not what I 
think, but how I think. 
Conceding, somewhat as in the previous section, that a choice 
of (1)—were intended by me to express belief, the question rises how 
you could assure yourself of my intention. Inference appears to be 
the only means at your command. The situation guarantees indeed 
your safety in the inference that I do believe in the raining as now in 
fact occurring—but, after all, no more than your safety in the inference 
that in (1) I do believe in the raining as in fact occurring sometimes. 
The inference that in either case I intend to express belief is quite a 
different matter, and is weakened by the fact that, had I intended to 
express belief, I could easily have done so unmistakably (e. g., “It 
rains and therefore I must go”, “It sometimes rains, but I should 
never give up a walk on account of that”); that obviously the raining 
was lateral to the going and therefore (as argued on pp. 129-134) 
would not be attended by belief, except in a second central aspect, 
separated mentally from my going; that such expression of belief was 
quite unnecessary; that expression of all belief experienced would be 
an intolerable burden, as illustrated on page 163, Note 38. 
16—S. & A. 
