364 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 
ing these elements, comparatively few in number, it plainly must 
be possible to form essentially all thoughts of which the mind is 
thus far capable. A method, then, which can symbolize thought- 
elements, is obviously available for the ultimate symbolization 
of thought-totals; and, as it lays the lighter and more endurable 
burden on memory, such symbolization of elements has been pre¬ 
ferred. Accordingly the symbols which language uses—that is, 
words—are, with few exceptions, not the signs of thoughts, but 
the signs of thought-elements, or ideas. 
Although then it may safely be admitted that, in some stage of 
its history, a thought exists in mind as a unit, a cod scions whole, 
an “Anschauung,” withbut distinct perception of its members, 
without recognition even that it consists of members, neverthe¬ 
less, as there are practically no symbols, for wholes, but only for 
members, it is obviously only thought-members that can be 
expressed. The first condition, then, of well developed speech, 
is the existence in mind of what such speech can express, that 
is, thought-members.. In other words thought must be regarded 
by the mind as not a simple whole, but as consisting of recog¬ 
nized members. 
The case is quite analogous to that of • sense-perception. I 
see my horse at one moment as a somewhat vague unit. At the 
next I specially perceive his head, neck, body, legs and tail. But 
I do not feel that I have developed any lack of continuity in the 
structure of the animal. Suppose now that I wish to show you 
this horse. It is night, and my only light, is that, of a, dark 
lantern. At the close range enforced by the smallness of the 
stable, I cannot exhibit him all at once. Accordingly I flash 
the light upon his head and then successively upon the other parts 
of his body. You do not at any moment see the animal as a 
whole. Yet the mental picture of him which you form, is. the 
picture of a whole. Indeed I suppose you had this wholeness in 
mind at the first appearance of the head. You did not regard 
that head as a fragment which might, or might not be followed by 
other fragments, which in case of their appearance you would 
join together. Yor did I feel that I was exhibiting fragments, 
which would require any union. I made a revelation of the 
animal, it is true, in successive installments; but each install¬ 
ment was given and received rather as a partial revelation than 
as the revelation of a part. In short we agreed that we were 
examining members, indeed, but members of a body whose 
wholeness was unimpaired. 
