Owen—Interrogative Thought—Means of Its Expression. 367 
It is possible then to analyze the idea-trio of thought in at 
least three different ways. “A equals B” may be regarded as 
consisting (1) of “A” and “equals B”, (2) of “A equals” and 
“B”, (3) of “A—B” and “equals”. Elach of these analyses is 
primarily bipartite. Eiaeh regards the sentence as, so to speak, 
binomial. 
Adopted analysis reveals at least three elements. 
It is possible also to recognize initially that a thought consists 
of three members—is tripartite—and that the corresponding 
sentence is trinomial. In “A equals B” such recognition, or 
analysis, develops three thought-members, a first term “A”, a last 
term “B”, a mid-term “equals”—a relation, that is, between 
the first and the last. If any one insist upon it, I admit a relation 
of mutual belonging between each part of this mental whole and 
the remainder—or between each part, and every other—or simul¬ 
taneously between all parts. That is, if copulas be desired, my 
thought, to my perception, simply bristles with them. But as 
mutual belonging seems to me, as said before, to be taken for 
granted, I content myself with the trio of terms directly revealed 
by my analysis. This analysis I propose to use on account of 
its special convenience, or rather its actual need, in the effort to 
interpret the sentence. 
Meantime I lay some stress upon the claim that the number 
of elements revealed by the adopted thought-analysis will at the 
least be three. To support this claim, suppose the number of 
elements revealed to be less, than three. Let “A” for instance be 
omitted. The remainder, namely what is expressed by “equals 
B”, I should simply regard as not a thought. Agreement with 
this opinion will largely depend on what is meant by thought. 
But I suppose that the adherents of the subject-predicate analysis 
would also hold that what is expressed by “equals B” is not a 
thought, but a fragment of a thought. A recognition of equality 
is the result of a comparison; and a comparison implies two ele¬ 
ments compared. I cannot think of an “equaling B,” except 
as an equaling on the part of something. I must then fill the 
place of the absent “A” at least, by an indefinite; and so soon as 
I do this, my mental total becomes again a thought complete, 
though obviously a thought of inferior value. 
Elqual thought-destruction) would) be wrought by the omission 
of “B” or “equals”. I therefore venture to call the relation 
