Owen—Interrogative Thought—Means of Its Expression . 371 
sumably takes the money as what I intended. Suppose, however, that 
he makes a mistake and, coming to thank me, appears with the Noah’s 
ark. I should tell him that I meant the money. That is, I pass beyond 
what in saying “present’' I did think of, reaching what I was able to 
think of with further effort, and intended him to think of. And so, too, 
with the idea expressed by “is,” it seems to me by no means, in the 
usual sense, indefinite or unknown, but rather, dim, because exposed 
to the feeble light of partial attention, and yet intended and expected 
to become clear in the brighter light of an attention which will be 
more complete when occasion requires. 
While then I cannot say that the idea expressed by “is” appears in 
the speaker’s mind in full distinctness at the moment the word is used, 
I believe that this idea is expected to become distinct in both his mind 
and that of the hearer, whenever necessary. Such an idea is obviously 
very different from the ordinary indefinite, which is expected not to 
become distinct. For instance, note the value of “somewhere” in “I 
somewhere heard that you have been ill.” 
Accordingly I make the somewhat precarious assumption that words 
should often be interpreted not merely by what is at the moment in 
the speaker’s mind, but rather by what would be in his mind, if he 
thought more carefully—what moreover he intends to be in the 
hearer’s mind, whenever occasion requires. In other words I regard 
ideas expressed as often germs, and propose to investigate them, when 
the need arises, in a developed stage. 
For the above conclusions, independently reached, support is offered 
by Stout—See.Analytic Psychology, ed. ’96, Chap. IV, Implicit Appre¬ 
hension, especially pp. 95-96. 
Banger of underestimating the freedom of thought. 
By this title I mean to indicate my belief that thought of the sort 
expressed by speech does not in every case respect the bounds set up 
by some psychologists. These will have it that every judgment is 
association of attribute with substance, or a recognition of association. 
For one, I should carry deference to this opinion so far as to admit 
that every judgment may be so remodeled as to be exactly of the indi¬ 
cated type—that possibly every judgment ought to be so remodeled. 
But that every judgment is of the indicated type, is quite another mat¬ 
ter. 
(a) Freedom in choice of relation. 
Overlooking the wider deviations from that type (see p. 361) I note 
that, given “A exceeds B,” I can conceive (and possibly ought to con¬ 
ceive) excess over B as predicate of A. That is, I can conceive of A 
and excess over B as in the relation of substance to its own attribute. 
I believe, however, that i commonly think of excess as a sequel to the 
