372 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts , and Letters. 
successive consciousness of A and B. My sentence is to me an ab¬ 
breviated mental history, which may be more completely told as fol¬ 
lows: First I thought of A. Then I thought of B. But while the 
idea of A was growing weak or waning, and that of B was growing 
strong or waxing, and I had them simultaneously in mind, I felt a 
difference named by the word “exceeds.” That is, my thought consists 
by no means of a substance, an attribute, and their mutual belonging, 
but rather of two ideas (which I do not seem to take the trouble to 
recognize as substance, attribute, or anything else) and a bulk relation 
between them. 
Given again the preliminary A and B, I am by no means confined to 
their difference in bulk. I may, for instance, be impressed by their 
similarity in contour, or their separation in space. That is, one pair 
of terms may develop different relations. 
Moreover, if one or both of the terms be changed, the way is opened 
for an even larger number of relations. While the bulk relation of 
A and B can be one only (that for instance expressed in A>B) the 
bulk relation of A and C may be that expressed in A>C; and the re¬ 
lation of A and D may be that expressed in A=D. 
The variety of thinkable relations being obviously very great, the 
variety of thoughts in whose formation they have a share must also 
itself be great—and that independently of further variety which may 
be based upon the special nature of related terms. The opportunity to 
establish species and even genera additional to the substance-attribute 
type I, however, neglect, insisting only on the existence of multiple 
types of relation, and therefore of thought itself. 
(b) Freedom in choice of relation-aspect—proverse or reverse. 
To illustrate, if I pass from a hill to the valley which lies beside it, I 
am conscious of a change which I call descent. Conversely, in pass¬ 
ing between identical terminals, but in the opposite direction, I ex¬ 
perience a change which I call ascent. Again, in passing mentally 
from A to B, I experience a difference which I express by excess, or say 
superiority. Accordingly “A>B”. But, in making a thought-transit 
from B to A, I develop “B<A”. 
Now so far as there be in the physical universe aught that corre¬ 
sponds to the mind-sensation expressed by > or <, — that is, so far as 
bulk-relation exist apart from mind—it must be unaffected by any act 
of mine, unaffected in particular by the direction in which I make my 
mental transit between A and B. Compared with such a relation out¬ 
side of mind, my ideas of superiority and inferiority may as well be 
ranked as merely different subjective impressions caused by a single 
objective relation seen from different points of approach—or say as 
different aspects of a single relation. These aspects being, so to speak, 
