376 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Aids, and Letters. 
THOUGHT-ASSOCIATES. 
( Thought-reality.) 
Examining the thought engrossed by “Orange exceeds lemon,” 
I find that it is real. But, in saying this, I must use the utmost 
care, to avoid misunderstanding. I mean, and only mean, that 
the thought is actually formed in my mind. It goes also with¬ 
out saying that each element of the thought, each idea thereof, 
is also in my mind. In other words I merely hold with others, 
that even intellectual phenomena are facts. As reality thus 
defined is characteristic of all our thoughts and all thought- 
elements, it may be neglected in their comparative study.* 
Thought-truth. 
By truth I mean accordance, so far as may be, with reality 
external to the momentary action of the mind—a being-matched 
by external reality.** 
*It is true that reality might be conceived by the mind along with 
one thought or a part thereof, and not with another thought or any 
of its parts. But I do not find that such is the fact. For instance, 
when I say that “Orange exceeds lemon,” I do not tell myself that 
thinking of an orange is with me a real occurrence. I draw no con¬ 
trast between my real thinking of the orange, and an unreal think¬ 
ing of an apple—or anything else of which I simply am not thinking. 
** It is possible of course to associate such truth with an individual 
thought-mem&er—that is, to make it the adjunct of an idea. For in¬ 
stance, given again the expression “Orange exceeds lemon,” I feel that 
my idea of the greater fruit is fairly accordant v/ith an existing exter¬ 
nal object, as is also my idea of the less. How far the idea of excess 
is matched by aught that outlies thought, is debatable. But as much 
as this, at least, is obvious: that the idea of excess does vary with varia¬ 
tions in external data. It may then be asumed that this idea is as true 
as it can be to that which is external. Each idea, that is each member 
of my thought, possesses then its maximum degree of truth attainable 
by mind. 
Such excellence of detail does not, however, mainly interest me. As 
I taste my soup, I care not greatly for the nature of its individual ele¬ 
ments. What I desire is that the soup itself be good; and if in this 
desire I am disappointed, I shall not be comforted by any eulogizing of 
the soup materials. Toward thought my behavior is quite analagous. 
For instance, the idea expressed by “Booth” is matched by a counter- 
