378 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts , and Letters. 
attribute of tb,e excess. Again, if I leave; the idea of truth, 
without a special expression, I suppose it would he held that, 
so far as truth is still a part of my meaning, it still attaches 
itself to the idea of excess. That is, in “A exceeds B” (Gonf. 
“A does not exceed Bi”) any truth regarded as part of what I 
mean, is an incorporated limiter of “exceeds”—a part of the 
total meaning of “exceeds” and limiter of another part, of that 
meaning, namely the idea of excess alone. 
Blut, as I have argued above (She the preceding note) any 
truth proper, which is associable with a single idea, will be that 
single idea’s being-matched by a, single element! of external real¬ 
ity ; with truth of this sort, however, I do not think my sentence 
deals. On the; other hand, the truth of my total thought, with 
which my sentence does deal, cannot, if I have rightly argued, 
appear as the attribute of a particular thought-member, except 
in the modified form of rightness, or co-productiveness (with 
other members) of true thought. Sluch modified truth, how- 
combined. So also when I say that “A exceeds B” or, more laboriously, 
“The excess of A over B is true,” I really mean that the excess is co- 
productive, with A and B, of a truth peculiar to the combination “A 
exceeds B.” 
Nov/ in the thought before me A and B are postulates, accepted with¬ 
out approval, without a mental vote—the charter members of an idea 
society. “Exceeds” on the other hand is offered as a later candidate. 
Truth being the aim of the society, it is important that the prospective 
new member co-operate effectively with the charter members, in truth- 
production. The intrinsic merit of the candidate is of less importance 
than his suitableness to members already enrolled. Accordingly, in the 
sentence “A exceeds B,” I should say that what I associate with excess 
is not precisely the idea of truth, but rather an idea of suitableness to 
A and B in true-thought production —or, in a word, rightness. 
By similar reasoning I should argue that, if in the same expression 
A be emphasized (or B), an idea of rightness is associated with A 
(or B). It appears accordingly that any member of that idea trio 
which constitutes an essential thought, may be regarded as an accession 
to the others, and further also as suitable to those others, in true- 
thought production—in other words as right—in other words as, very 
roughly speaking, true. I have accordingly carried one step further 
the thought-forms presented on pages 361-362. 
All of these thought-forms I propose from now on to neglect in favor 
of another, not that they are uncommon or inferior, but merely because 
they promise no addition to what may be gained from the examination 
of that other, which has the advantage of being simpler. 
