382 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences , Arts, and Letters. 
suppose that, as you sit in my study, your attention is caught 
by a painting, on which you invite my comment. If I should 
say “That painting is a portrait,” you would understand me to 
vouch for its being matched by a real person. If on the other 
hand I should say “(Some claim) the painting to be a portrait,” 
you would understand me to do all that I did before, except that 
I should no longer vouch for the matching. That ia, you would 
understand that I have merely thought of the matching—that, so 
to speak, I have not felt it. 
So also, if I should say “My son to lead his class,” you would 
understand that a mental picture of my son’s leading his class 
is in my mental visual field, along with a being-matched by fact 
—or, in other words, along with truth (Compare “My son not 
to lead his class”) ; but this truth again I do not feel; I only 
think of it. I put before you, so to speak, the 1 elements of a men¬ 
tal experiment; but what ultimately happens, or say the reaction, 
I do -not exhibit. ISTow it seems; to me that the reaction is 
precisely what you most of all would wish to know. If I put 
a slice of lemon in my mouth, I shall hardly thereby greatly 
interest you. But if you can learn how this experiment affects 
me, you may find it worth your while to do so. Again, if from 
my words yon merely know that certain ideas assemble in my 
mind, your knowledge has for you but little value. But if you 
learn the effect which they produce upon me, you may feel re¬ 
paid for your share of the effort incident to thought-communi¬ 
cation. Given then the truth or the untruth of “My son’s lead¬ 
ing his class”—or given, say, “My son to lead his class” or “My 
son not to lead his class”—if you can learn that I fear or hope 
for either—that I like or dislike, desire, regret, expect, believe 
or disbelieve the one or the other—you may esteem such learn¬ 
ing worth your effort. 
How any one of the reactions noted—and others also—may be 
expressed by speech. But most of them require the aid of 
special words. For instance, given “My son to lead his class,” 
if I wish you understand that my reaction is what is known as 
hope, or expectation, I am obliged to say that “I hope, or expect, 
my son to lead his class.” That is, the reaction requires a spe¬ 
cial word for its expression.. 
Suppose however that, given “My son to 1 lead his class,” my 
reaction is belief. In this case I merely say that “My son leads 
his class.” That is, the word “leads” expresses all that was 
