386 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 
feriority, one or both, or any other substitute for tbe idea of ex¬ 
cess. For the moment it may be enough to remark that, in the 
expression “Lemon doesn’t exceed orange,” the inclination which 
the enclitic “n’t” exhibits towards its neighbor “does,” or say 
its aversion shown to “exceed,” affords some indication that the 
mind does not associate the negative with the excess. Indeed, 
were it to do so, the strictly proper word would not be “not,” 
but “non.” 
I regard the “not” as suggesting solely the idea of untruth. 
Thus construed, expression (2) reveals a thought attended by the 
idea of its untruth. The obvious antagonism of one thought to 
the other strongly intimates that expression (1) should be taken 
as standing for a thought attended by its truth.* 
This idea of truth, or untruth, I expect to find in every thought 
to be examined. I have, however, given it somewhat careful 
attention, because it seems to me that, without it, thought of 
greater complexity cannot thoroughly be understood. 
*1 admit that (1) might sometimes better be interpreted as not sug¬ 
gesting either truth or untruth—sometimes, again, as calling up to 
mind the categorical idea of truth-or-untruth. With such occasions 
however I am not dealing. In “I believe lemon to exceed orange”, that 
which I believe is, as it seems to me, the truth of my thought—just 
as what I believe, in saying “I oelieve lemon not to exceed orange”, 
is the untruth of my thought. It is thus and thus only that I elect to 
construe the expression ‘‘Lemon to exceed orange”. That is, of 
thoughts which might be indicated by it, I choose that one which is 
ready for the accession of my belief. In that one accordingly I find 
the adjunctive idea of thought-truth. 
This idea of truth is however easily overlooked, for the following 
reason. Affirmative expressions are, in linguistic practice, much more 
common than negative. The truth which ordinarily attends a thought, 
becomes a matter of course, and easily fails to be noted. Were you 
to ask me what I wish you to think of when I utter (1), I should be 
very apt to answer: ‘‘the relation between lemon and orange”. But 
suppose you repeat the question with (2). I must now put in the idea 
of untruth, and answer:, “the untruth of the relation, etc.” If now 
you repeat your question with (1), I shall answer: “the truth of the 
relation, etc.” That is, I am so used to the idea of truth, that I or¬ 
dinarily overlook it. But if you sharpen my attention by directing it 
first to the untruth, which I do not intend, I become aware, and 
keenly, of the truth which I do intend. 
