Oiven i —Interrogative Thought—Means of Its Expression, 387 
Its distinctive. 
Ill© idea of truth which I seem, to find in the conception when 
it is not negative, is far from being an endorsement, I meet the 
thought arising in my mind, as the bank-official meets the bank¬ 
note submitted to his expert judgment. He may be asked to 
decide upon its genuineness; or, on the contrary, he may be asked 
to decide upon its spuriousness. The; idea, of the note will ac¬ 
cordingly be attended in his mind by an idea: of either 1 genuine¬ 
ness or spuriousness—say the idea of genuineness. But this at¬ 
tendant idea is merely the aspect in which the idea, of the note is 
offered. It does not predetermine ultimate opinion. And so 
it is with the truth which forms a part of what is expressed by 
“Lemon to exceed orange.” Thinking of such truth does not 
commit me. I still am free to reject, (or accept) this truth, 
precisely as, I still am free to reject (or accept) the untruth 
which forms a part of what is expressel by “Lemon not to exceed 
orange.” That such is the fact, I think appears in the expres¬ 
sion “I disbelieve the lemon to exceed the orange,” in which I 
reject what seems to be presented in the aspect, of truth—and in 
“I disbelieve the lemon not to exceed the orange,” in which I 
reject what is obviously presented in the aspect of untruth. The 
presence then of the idea of truth, as thus far noted, is far from 
implying that anything is true; it only implies a preference to 
regard a thought in its, possibility of being true, rather than in 
its possibility of being untrue. Conversely the presence of the 
idea of untruth implies only a preference to regard a thought 
in the possibility of being untrue. 
The significance of my examination is less in what I have 
found, than in what I have not found. In particular I have not 
found any personal endorsement of the conception—its truth or 
its untruth. I have found, in other words, no element, of belief. 
As I expect to find this element in other forms of thought to be 
examined, I make the provisory claim, that the distinctive of 
the conception is the absence of belief. 
As you are likely to decide on the validity of any conception 
I reveal, you might prefer me to pose it unattended by ideas of 
truth or untruth, leaving you to form 1 the verdict “That is true” 
or “That, is untrue.” But in linguistic practice I disregard 
such preference', and submit my thought in the aspect of truth 
or untruth, inviting the verdict, “I accept that,” or “I reject 
that.” Offering however no verdict, of my own, I also do not 
