446 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 
By this question I am plainly trying to find out something 
about Brown’s being honest; that is, a thought expressible by 
“Brown to be honest” is merely part of an intended larger men¬ 
tal structure', say a judgment. This part contains however all 
that is required of it, regarded as a mere conception, i. e., a first 
term and a last term named respectively by “Brown” and “hon¬ 
est,” and a mid-term or relation named by “to-be”—a relation 
which may be known as that of substance to its own attribute. 
Further detail might be added, but none is indispensable to 
formal thought-completeness. Accordingly the missing judg¬ 
ment-element is not an essential element of a conception. 
The remaining judgment-elements which may be missing, are 
truth or untruth of thought, and belief. Examining first the 
former, I juxtapose the expressions. “Brown to be honest” and 
“Brown not. to be honest.” Of these, the latter presents a mental 
picture, as if it were unmatched by reality external to itself. 
That is, thei thought expressed is put in the aspect of untruth. 
Such being the case, as argued on p. 385-386,1 conclude that the 
antagonistic “Blrown to be honest” expresses a thought appear¬ 
ing on my mental stage in the antagonistic aspect of truth; that 
I intend it to appear on the mental stage of my hearer in that 
aspect; that my intention is realized. And what I claim for the 
expression “Brown to be honest,” I also claim for the expres¬ 
sion “Is Brown honest ?,” antagonizing it with “Isn’t Brown 
honest?” That is, I succeed in establishing in your mind the 
thought of “Brown’s being honest”—attended, as in my own, 
by its truth. (See however pp. 451, etc.) I conclude accord¬ 
ingly that, in the judgment, which the present form of question 
aims to make sufficient, all elements are present, except belief. 
Belief is absent. Were it not. absent, the occasion for a ques¬ 
tion would itself be absent. An interrogative status would not 
develop in my mind. What would develop would be expressible 
by “Brown is honest,” or more fully by “I believe in the truth 
of Brown’s being honest.” That is, I should form an affirmative 
judgment. As I cannot do this, I conclude that what is absent 
from such judgment is belief—a belief which, if present, would 
bear upon the truth of Brown’s being honest (or, in a negative 
judgment, upon the untruth of Brown’s being honest). 
It is obvious that also' disbelief is absent from the mind. Its 
absence however is not felt.; for its presence was not planned for, 
any more than that of fear or gladness. Considering the judg- 
