Owen — Inten'ogative Thought—Means of Its Expression. 447 
ment-void as the void in a judgment intended—a judgment lin¬ 
guistically restricted to belief in truth or untruth of a thought— 
I hold that in the speaker’s consciousness belief alone is missing. 
The desideratum — belief-or-disbelief. 
In making the desideratum cover that very disbelief so care¬ 
fully excluded from assertion, there is a seeming inconsistency^ 
which may however be relieved as follows: 
If the argument conducted on p. 421 be correct, assertion— 
that is, the expression of belief that a thought is true (or un¬ 
true)—^antedates interrogation. To this proposition it is the 
merest corollary, that, before interrogation is attempted, the prac¬ 
tice of assertion develops what may be called an assertive mental 
habit. It is then quite conceivable, that the special form as¬ 
sumed by the judgment interrogative as to belief, will not be 
determined solely by desire for information, but will also be 
affected by the operative method of assertion. That it is in 
fact so influenced—and that most oddly—may appear as fol¬ 
lows. 
In following the assertive method, I form a mental pic¬ 
ture—say a mere conception—in the expectation of believing, 
therefore discarding disbelief. I expect to believe that my 
picture is true:, or else untrue. Sometimes however my expecta¬ 
tion comes to naught; and at these' times it is, that I ask a ques¬ 
tion of the order now considered, e. g. “Is Brown honest ?” That 
is, as the result of being disappointed in my expectation to be¬ 
lieve, I develop a desire that you make good my failure. The 
special mental form of what I desire you to do, is accordingly 
determined for me 1 by my disappointed expectation—is cast in 
the mould of a belief arrested in development. To change my 
figure, the question must be 1 studied as an: effort, so to speak, to 
float a stranded assertion; and much depends on when the asser¬ 
tion runs aground. 
(1) It may be that, having formed a mental picture, and con¬ 
templated its possible truth and untruth, I feel exactly equal 
inclinations toward the two, but no preponderating inclination— 
or say propension;—toward either one:. That is, my failure to 
believe the one or the other is a consciously double failure. 
Suppose that, in this mental state, I appeal to you for aid. 
This aid you might afford, if I should set before you the two 
alternatives (truth and untruth), both of which I fail to believe,. 
