450 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 
believe (to be true or untrue) ; and all that I care to know is 
tbe mental reaction which you experience when confronted with 
a thought the duplicate of mine. That is, I wish to know your 
belief or disbelief in a particular thought—'accordingly, a par¬ 
ticular belief or disbelief, distinguishable from others by its 
being experienced in the presence of a particular thought. In 
a sense then my desideratum'—that is, your belief-or-disbelief— 
requires description; and description is accomplished by the 
exhibition of the thought, belief-or-disbelief in which you are 
to experience. The exposition of desideratum seems then pre¬ 
determined as the nomination of a belief-or-disbelief which, in 
the presence of a particular thought, you are to experience. 
The nomination of belief-or-disbelief is indispensable, because 
without it you might suppose my desideratum to be some other 
mental reaction of which you are capable—for instance, hope, 
fear, joy, distress, etc. The expression of the thought in which 
your belief-or-disbelief is to be experienced, is also indispensa¬ 
ble, because without it you might tell me some belief-or-disbelief 
in which I have no interest. Accordingly, to satisfy the desire 
which my question aims to 1 realize, I must not only name my 
desideratum, belief-or-disbelief, but also restrict, describe or 
define it, by adding the thought on which it is to operate. 
Assertion of description. 
The little which I have to say upon this topic will be said to 
best advantage on pp. 455-456. 
Desire to be told desideratum. 
Under this title I have nothing to add to arguments advanced 
on pp. 420-421, from which I concluded that a question must 
be understood as distinctly announcing the speaker’s desire to be 
told the required conception-element of the judgment which he 
has vainly sought to form. 
Assertion of desire. 
Argument supporting such assertion would essentially repeat 
considerations indicated on pp. 421-423. 
Truth instead of untruth and vice versa. 
In forming an interrogative judgment of the present type, 
I have argued that I am somewhat nearer to believing the truth 
