Owen—Interrogative Thought—Means of Its Expression. 453 
have. This corresponding element being unknown to me, I 
can conceive it only vaguely as a belief-or-disbelief, at some time 
to be experienced by me, but in the mean time experienced by 
you. The situation is, accordingly, rather intricate. I do not 
doubt, indeed, that language can be made to deal with it dis¬ 
tinctly and completely. But I do extremely doubt, whether the 
game would be worth the candle—whether, indeed, the candle 
could have been supplied by the earlier players of the game. It 
seems to me that the believing I and you are retired from: the 
fore-ground of consciousness to such a distance, that they are no 
longer separated by the mental eye. So far, at least, as further 
examination is concerned, I think that any consciously differ¬ 
entiated I and you may be regarded as automatically inter¬ 
changing when required, without the need of special symbols— 
without, indeed, the need of special recognition. 
Expects answer in terms of* belief only. 
In my own attempt to form a judgment—say upon the honesty 
of Brown—I recognized that, in the condensed assertion now 
considered, disbelief is barred by linguistic practice—that I 
must choose between belief in truth of thought and belief in its 
untruth. Neglecting say the latter, the only course remaining 
open to me was. to believe the truth; but this I could not do. 
Turning to you for help, and realizing that you must in some 
way be free to approve or disapprove my thought, I ignored 
linguistic bounds, inviting you to express your belief-or -dis¬ 
belief. 
Now if it happen that belief is that, which you in fact ex¬ 
perience, you can carry out my programme. But if it happen 
that you disbelieve, you cannot. That is, while, in condensed 
assertion, you can express belief, you cannot express disbelief. 
Indeed, I have no expectation that you will. I am after all 
aware of your linguistic limitation. In case you disbelieve, I 
appreciate that you will reconstruct your judgment into a belief 
in the truth, or untruth of my offered thought. Thus, to my 
question “Is Brown honest .?/ 7 I expect that you will answer 
either “Brown is honest 77 (or an equivalent), meaning that you 
believe in the truth of Brown’s being honest, or “Brown is not 
honest , 77 meaning that you believe in the untruth of Brown’s 
being honest. That is, although in my embarrassment I ask 
an expression of belief-or-disbelief, I expect in answer only the 
